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CSR Instruments – A guide for 
policymakers  
 
 
Anke Hassel 
 
Globalisation has prompted two related developments: First, the distances between 
regions and people have shrunk with closer cooperation and integration, leading to a 
higher degree of political interconnectedness. Second, firms now have further-reaching 
economic power, and therefore, responsibilities. Both trends have changed the role of 
the firm in the global economy and society by raising public expectations about how 
firms should contribute to the social and environmental well-being of the globe.  
 
These developments have also shaped the discussion of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). Traditionally, CSR involved a mixed bag of management tools designed to please 
the firm’s stakeholders: local communities, employees and consumers. A range of 
activities were understood as constituting CSR. Firms donated to local schools, 
supported charities, ran art galleries and encouraged their staff to volunteer for 
community programs. Managers today continue to subscribe to a number of arguments 
in favour of a “business case for CSR.” Employee motivation, consumer demands and 
the war for talents are all understood as contributing to the firm’s success.  
 
But in the context of globalisation, CSR has transformed into a much more 
comprehensive package, centered on the concept of corporate ‘responsibility’. In today’s 
global marketplace, CSR is about turning firms’ negative externalities into positive 
contributions to communities and the environment, in a way that reaches far beyond the 
structures of national and global governance. The benchmark for a globally responsible 
firm is no longer limited to whether it cares for the communities in which it operates and 
behaves as a good employer, but also to what extent its value chain and business model 
creates or reduces problems for the environment, the wider community and democratic 
processes around the world.  
 
This more comprehensive take on CSR – which simultaneously increases the 
responsibility and the legitimacy of the firm as a global actor – has in the last two 
decades transformed CSR into a public policy issue. Many arguments motivate 
policymakers to engage in the CSR debate: Firms can contribute to the provision of 
public goods and the solution of policy problems at a global scale; they can support 
governance in areas of limited statehood, and play a role in the achievement of social 
and environmental aims. Governments today are forced to handle increasing numbers 
of policy problems, and with fewer and more limited resources. The spread of the 
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market has unleashed productivity and growth.  This, in turn, has generated the need 
for a more satisfactory definition of the role of the firm in global governance.  
  
This handbook on CSR instruments outlines the evolving role of firms in solving policy 
problems.1 It discusses various types of CSR instruments designed to support or develop 
firms’ socially responsible behaviour. It is based on the assumption that policymakers 
and analysts working in CSR-related areas of public policy require a better 
understanding and awareness of the instruments at their disposal when designing CSR 
development strategies.  
 
The contributions in this handbook, although wide ranging, do not cover all available 
instruments in the CSR toolbox. For instance, product certification and labeling are not 
covered in the book. On the other hand, some of the instruments that are covered, such 
as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and the Equator Principles, are business initiatives 
that require little input from public policymakers. The Global Reporting Initiative is also 
a private initiative, run by a non-governmental organisation (NGO), as is the ISO26000 
norm.  The Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, by 
contrast, are initiatives of international organisations. At the level of national 
governments, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative and Sustainable 
Procurement Policies are presented.  
 
The aim of this handbook is not to single out any one best approach. Nor does it attempt 
to draw conclusions about the relative value of voluntary agreements versus hard 
regulation. In our view, the question of the voluntary nature of CSR, which has long 
dominated the debate, misses the crucial point about the new role of the firm in the 
global economy. The success of corporate responsibility requires interaction between 
CSR as a management approach with expectations about firms’ behaviour established 
within the political and civil society arenas. Many firms have adopted codes of conduct 
and internal management processes in which they define standard operating procedures 
on social, environmental and political issues. These practices coincide and interact with 
a number of regulatory bodies, from self-regulatory bodies such as the Equator 
Principles, to learning platforms such as the GRI or Global Compact, or hard regulatory 
tools such as the OECD Guidelines.2  
 
Global firms need to redefine their political, ethical, social and environmental standards, 
and should use CSR practices in doing so. The more active firms engage in learning 
platforms, where they exchange ideas, problems and potential solutions with each other. 
Governments can use these platforms to forward their own expectations regarding 
desirable private sector behaviour.  
 
Private self-regulation and learning platforms are flexible tools, since standards are 
usually set by few actors. On the other hand, implementation is weak and depends on 
the credibility of the participants. After some time, voluntary codes, self-regulation and 
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learning platforms must consider implementation and monitoring; otherwise, 
participants might reap the benefits of signing up, but not deliver on their commitments.  
 
Government regulation interacts with self-regulation and voluntary codes. Export credit 
guarantees, social public procurement and ethical investment requirements for publicly 
subsidized pension funds give indirect support to CSR standards. As a result, self-
regulation, private regulation and indirect government regulation complement each 
other, creating a web of rules and mutually reinforcing standards. Each of these 
elements serves a different purpose: codes of conduct to educate management, self-
regulation to experiment with standards, and indirect government regulation to extend 
these standards to those firms which so far have been absent from the CSR agenda.   
 
Which CSR instruments policymakers should focus on therefore depends on the stage of 
development of CSR instruments in their country, region or sector. There is no ‘one size 
fits all’ policy recommendation. In a business community distanced from CSR, multi-
stakeholder forums and learning platforms are a helpful starting point. If firms have 
already embraced a comprehensive CSR agenda, but are reluctant to deal with problems 
in their supply chain, an appropriate approach may be to sharpen the teeth of OECD 
Guideline implementation.  
 
From a public policy perspective, it is important to underline the importance of 
governments’ approach. Even if governments decide not to regulate CSR, they have 
ample opportunity to lay down a CSR agenda. Governments can legitimize self-
regulation and private regulation by cooperating with voluntary standards, by funding 
private agencies and by applying voluntary standards when purchasing goods or giving 
credit guarantees. They can jointly develop criteria for such standards with private 
agencies. They can also express the expectation that firms contribute more to the 
monitoring and evaluation of business practices; firms monitor their main competitors 
closely, and often have a superior knowledge about the true standards in the industry 
than they reveal to public authorities. Finally, governments can set up or support 
watchdogs for corporate compliance with voluntary standards and insist that those 
firms which repeatedly use blue-wash strategies not be represented by global industry 
associations.  
 
In developing an effective CSR strategy, policymakers cannot hope to deal 
comprehensively with the range of actors currently in the field. Governments and 
policymakers will have to decide who to back as leaders in the market for voluntary 
standards. In doing so, they will help concentrate the initiatives currently on the market. 
This guide for policymakers does not suggest that the initiatives it presents will become 
or remain market leaders. However, by giving an overview, it should help policymakers 
select the most relevant initiatives for their circumstances.  
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OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises 
 
 
Viacheslav Shelegeiko  
 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a set of voluntary 
recommendations for multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in and from forty 
adhering countries.3 They address all major areas of business ethics, including 
employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, information 
disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, 
and taxation. The participating countries account for 85 percent of world investment 
flows.4  
 
The Guidelines are one of four annexes to OECD Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, a broad political commitment adopted by 
OECD Governments in 1976 to facilitate direct investment among OECD Members. The 
other three annexes are instruments through which adhering countries commit to 
treating foreign-controlled enterprises in at least the same way as national ones, avoid 
imposing conflicting requirements on enterprises from different countries, and improve 
cooperation on measures affecting international direct investment.  
 
At the time of their publication, the Guidelines engendered one of the first attempts to 
produce a multilateral code of conduct for companies operating in diverse 
environments. Promoting “rules of the game” in areas where multilateral agreement is 
necessary for individual countries to progress in a globalized economy, their purpose is 
to help MNEs operate in harmony with government policies and societal expectations 
through positive contributions to economic, environmental and social progress. 
 
The Guidelines were substantially revised in 2000, and adopted following two years of 
consultations involving business and trade union committees to the OECD, BIAC 
(Business and Industry Advisory Committee) and TUAC (Trade Union Advisory 
Committee), respectively, as well as NGOs. Important revisions included its extension to 
the global scale (rather than only to the OECD world as before), coverage of both 
multinationals and their local subcontractors, and explicit inclusion of internationally 
recognized human rights and core labour standards. Chapters on corruption and 
consumer interests were also added. Moreover, the revised Guidelines assign a distinct 
role to civil society/NGOs, along with governments, businesses and trade unions. The 
2000 Guidelines establish general policies that multinationals are expected to follow in 
eight policy areas: disclosure of information, employment and industrial relations, 
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environment, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, 
competition and taxation. Each policy area is accompanied by implementation 
procedures and commentaries. 
 
Institutional structure and implementation 
The institutional set-up for promoting and implementing the Guidelines is described in 
the OECD Council Decision and its Procedural Guidance. It consists of five main 
elements: National Contact Points (NCPs); the OECD Investment Committee; the 
business representative body BIAC; the trade union representative body TUAC; and 
NGOs, especially OECD Watch, an international network of civil society organisations. 
These elements are briefly described below:  
 
• NCPs are government offices responsible for encouraging observance of the 
Guidelines within countries, and for ensuring that they are well-known and understood 
by the national business community, investors, employee organisations, NGOs and 
other interested parties. NCPs translate the Guidelines into national languages; organize 
promotional activities; handle inquiries; discuss and assist in solving problems at the 
national level; gather information on national experiences with the Guidelines; and 
report annually to the Committee.  
• The Investment Committee, consisting of member states and observers, is 
responsible for overseeing the functioning of the Guidelines and to take steps to enhance 
their effectiveness. Its functions include: responding to requests on specific or general 
aspects of the Guidelines; organizing exchanges of views on related matters with social 
partners and non-members; issuing “clarifications”; reviewing the Guidelines and/or 
procedural decisions in order to ensure their continued relevance and effectiveness; 
organizing promotional activities; and reporting to the OECD Council. The non-binding 
nature of the Guidelines precludes the Committee from acting as a judicial or quasi-
judicial body.  
• BIAC, TUAC and OECD Watch (and other NGOs), as representatives of 
business, labour and civil society, are regularly consulted by the Investment Committee 
on matters relating to the Guidelines, and on other issues concerning international 
investment and multinational enterprises. They, in turn, may request consultations with 
NCPs. They are also responsible for informing their member federations about new 
developments in the Guidelines and for seeking their members’ inputs on 
implementation procedures. They may also participate in promotional activities 
organized by NCPs or the Committee on a national, regional or multilateral basis. 
 
When issues arise concerning implementation of the Guidelines in relation to specific 
instances of business conduct, NCPs are expected to help resolve them. Generally, issues 
are dealt with by the NCP in whose country the issue has arisen, but bilateral contacts 
between NCPs may also be pursued. After making an initial assessment of whether the 
issues raised merit further examination, the NCP will offer its good offices to help the 
parties involved to resolve the issues. Where no agreement can be reached on the issues 
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raised, the NCP issues a public statement or makes recommendations. Any person or 
organisation may approach an NCP to enquire about matters related to the Guidelines. 
 
Clarifications 
As the Guidelines are drafted in general terms, under certain circumstances 
clarifications of meanings may be necessary. The purpose of such clarifications is to 
provide additional information about whether and how the Guidelines apply in a 
particular business situation. Although clarifications may arise in connection with the 
activities of a specific enterprise, they are not intended to assess the appropriateness of 
that enterprise’s conduct.  
 
The clarification procedure is as follows: If a party is uncertain about the Guidelines’ 
applicability in a particular context it should approach the NCP. Parties may include 
enterprises, businesses, labour organisations, NGOs or any other interested party. If an 
enterprise is directly concerned, the NCP informs the enterprise that an issue has been 
raised. The NCP, business and labour representatives and other interested parties then 
try to clarify the matter. The NCP may contact other NCPs if the issue under 
consideration concerns more than one adhering country. In case of any doubt or 
divergent views, the matter is brought to the attention of the Investment Committee. 
Final responsibility for clarifications lies with the Committee. A request for clarification 
may be referred to the Committee by government authorities, TUAC or BIAC. The 
Committee discusses the matter, and consults with BIAC and TUAC. If an enterprise is 
directly concerned, it may express its view to the Committee orally, in writing or 
through BIAC. Following deliberations, the Committee may issue a clarification of how 
the Guidelines apply under the given circumstances. Clarifications do not constitute a 
judgment on the behaviour of an individual enterprise, and thus do not refer to them by 
name.  
 
Compliance 
The Guidelines are unique amongst CSR instruments in that they constitute an inter-
governmental agreement. This has serious implications for their implementation. First of 
all, it implies a duality in coerciveness: the Guidelines are binding for governments and 
non-binding for companies. Second, this duality translates into two analytically distinct 
phases of compliance: governments have to comply with their international 
commitments, while companies can choose to comply or not. Thus, the ultimate goal of 
changing firm behaviour in such a way that their practices “contribute to economic, 
social and environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable development” 
depends heavily on governments’ efforts in implementing the Guidelines. The two 
phases of compliance are elaborated below.  
 
Government compliance 
Signatories’ main commitment under the Guidelines involves setting up NCPs to handle 
promotion and implementation activities. NCPs can take different forms: a single 
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government agency, an inter-ministerial body or a tripartite (government, labour and 
business) arrangement. Whichever form is chosen, labour, business and NGOs must be 
informed about the NCP’s existence, and the NCP itself is expected to develop and 
maintain relations with these groups. In this way, governments are pressured to uphold 
their commitments by domestic actor engagement. 
 
Company compliance  
The Guidelines are not legally binding for companies. Any interested party believing a 
company to be in violation of the Guidelines can raise the case with the NCP. The NCP 
then attempts to resolve the issue by seeking advice from authorities, experts and 
relevant stakeholders, consulting NCPs in other countries, seeking guidance from the 
OECD Investment Committee, providing a forum for discussion between affected 
parties, and offering conciliation or mediation. If the parties are unable to agree on how 
to solve the problem, the NCP is required to issue a public statement on the case and/or 
make recommendations to the parties on how the Guidelines apply in the given context. 
Companies are expected to voluntarily change their behaviour, or, if the NCP fails to 
solve the problem, change it under public pressure following publication of their non-
compliance.  
 
Policy Discussion 
The policy discussion surrounding the implementation of the Guidelines is largely 
driven by NGOs; most notably, OECD Watch, Friends of the Earth, Corporate Watch, 
Human Rights Watch and NGOs from the Clean Clothes Campaign. The most 
outspoken critics among them argue that the OECD is a “crude, lumbering think-tank of 
the most wealthy nations, bulldozing over human dignity without pause for thought”5; 
that the Guidelines are “a non-enforceable 'gentlemen's agreement', [which] is utterly 
useless”6; and that “there is the crucial defect that the Guidelines still are merely 
recommendations [which] will remain politically ineffectual.”7  
 
In addition to substantial skepticism about the effectiveness of voluntarism for 
companies, NGOs also point to deficiencies in the operation of NCPs in adhering 
countries. NCPs are said to adopt widely differing approaches in the way they handle 
complaints, with some critics pointing to “the increasing use of procedural devices by 
some NCPs to disallow complaints.”8 NCPs are also accused of being slow and 
cumbersome. According to OECD Watch, the average time taken by NCPs to conclude 
specific instance procedures is about 10 months, with some NCPs – such as in the UK – 
taking more than twice as long. The Austrian NCP rarely takes responsibility for dealing 
with complaints, often delegating issues to other NCPs.9  
 
The Dutch NCP, by contrast, is singled out as the best performer: “decisions on 
admissibility are usually taken within a reasonable period of time after a couple of 
months; the complainants soon thereafter have a meeting with the NCP and other 
government representatives to discuss the case; after these meetings the NCP circulates 
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minutes. After an exchange of information between the parties the NCP convenes a 
further (and usually) final, meeting after which a decision is made.”10 This procedure is 
especially exemplary in light of commonly cited failures of NCPs to communicate 
appropriately with all stakeholders, regarded in NGO reports as a serious obstacle 
facing the Guidelines’ implementation.11 The Dutch NCP is also commended for playing 
a proactive role in helping identify points of agreement as well as areas of disagreement.  
 
Another point of contention in civil society concerns supply chain responsibility. 
Although the 2000 revision of the Guidelines extended the scope of the document to 
MNEs’ supply chain partners and sub-contractors, the Guidelines remain inapplicable at 
many points along the supply chain. In 2003 the OECD Investment Committee held that 
the Guidelines had been developed in the specific context of international investment by 
MNEs, and that their application rests on the presence of an “investment nexus”; that is, 
investment rather than trade gives companies leverage over their partners, so 
investment activities alone should be covered by the Guidelines. NGOs expressed 
dissatisfaction with the decision, saying that it entailed a re-interpretation of the 
document. They argued that companies had other ways of influencing their partners, 
such as market power and certain business practices (certification, product tracing 
systems). Accordingly, OECD Watch maintains that “no artificial distinction between 
trade and investment should be made in the interpretation or implementation of the 
Guidelines. The scope of application … should be interpreted as recommendations for 
responsible international business conduct.”12 
 
From the perspective of trade unions, the Guidelines are primarily the responsibility of 
governments. Governments should improve their NCPs’ capacities to pressure 
businesses, to ensure that they follow certain standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability and provide labour with fair conditions. According to one TUAC 
representative, potential improvements could include enhancing awareness-raising 
activities, both inside and outside of adhering countries, and providing timeframes for 
dealing with cases.13 In addition, trade unions have joined NGOs in calling on 
governments to link services to companies, such as subsidies, export credits or political 
insurance through export credit guarantees, to individual firms’ compliance with the 
Guidelines.  
 
Recommendations 
The Guidelines are a potentially effective CSR instrument. A number of unique 
strengths put them in a privileged position among other instruments. In particular, the 
Guidelines’ legitimacy is supported by the governments of forty countries, accounting 
for a majority of the world’s investment flows. Additionally, the Guidelines apply to 
MNEs and their supply chain partners in both adhering and non-adhering countries. 
This almost global coverage, combined with their comprehensive thematic coverage, 
make the Guidelines an instrument of prime reference for companies. Finally, the 
Guidelines provide for institutionalized interaction between businesses, unions, 
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governments, NGOs and society as a whole as an integral part of their implementation 
procedures.  
 
However, comprehensiveness comes at the cost of specificity. The Guidelines establish a 
set of useful normative benchmarks, but company managers require more practical 
guidance if they are to make use of the Guidelines in their day-to-day business practices. 
This is particularly important because the Guidelines are voluntary for companies, 
which leaves them at risk of becoming yet another set of principles, void of meaningful 
application. A further problem is the Guidelines’ lack of identifiable targets and 
indicators with which to monitor company compliance; the Guidelines fail to provide 
for systematic monitoring, leaving it to “interested” parties to engage in ad hoc 
monitoring efforts instead. Clearer company performance indicators could regularize 
this system. Finally, although trade activities are not explicitly beyond the Guidelines’ 
scope, they are effectively circumscribed by the investment nexus. When coupled with 
NCPs’ unwillingness to act, as documented in many NGO reports, these weaknesses 
could render the instrument completely ineffectual.  
 
The recommendations below address the Guidelines’ most prominent weaknesses: 
NCPs’ inadequate performance, the lack of systematic company compliance monitoring, 
the lack of practical guidance for managers, the narrowness of application to investment 
only, and weak incentive structures.  
 
Enhance promotional capacity of NCPs. The OECD should play a more active role in 
coordinating the promotional activities of NCPs, and making sure that all are equally 
active and working as a network. It could also provide technical assistance to less 
developed NCPs. The capacity of NCPs also depends on the efforts of respective 
governments. 
 
Establish a clear timeframe for complaint-handling process. This would make the 
process more predictable and easier to follow. The OECD should coordinate efforts of 
governments so that timeframes between NCPs are similar.  
 
Connect the Guidelines with more specific reporting (e.g. the Global Reporting 
Initiative). This would provide managers with practical guidance on how to act on the 
Guidelines. Furthermore, it would establish concrete targets and indicators against 
which NGOs and other concerned parties could more consistently judge companies’ 
performance.  
 
Encourage regular company performance monitoring by NGOs. This measure is 
especially important in the absence of real enforcement. It constitutes a compensatory 
mechanism for the voluntary nature of the Guidelines.   
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Link the Guidelines to stronger incentives (e.g. export credit guarantees). Governments 
should consider such connections as a powerful motivating factor for companies to 
comply with the Guidelines.  
 
Expand the Guidelines’ scope to cover trade. This recommendation is likely to face 
substantial opposition from companies. But once achieved, it would ensure the 
Guidelines’ applicability to all types of international business conduct and at every level 
of the supply chain.  
 
 
 
ISO 26000 “Guidance on Social 
Responsibility” 
 
Tobias Hausotter 
 
Projected for release in 2010, ISO 26000 is an international standard on social 
responsibility14 currently being developed by the non-profit International Organisation 
of Standardization (ISO) under its 5 year strategic plan (2005-2010), “Standards for a 
Sustainable World.”15  
 
Entitled “Guidance on Social Responsibility,” ISO 26000 will provide SR guidelines for 
all types of organisations – public and private – around the world. As such, it will not 
contain any requirements and is intended neither for third-party certification nor as a 
management system standard.16 In the realm of CSR, ISO 26000 may thus be 
characterized as an instrument of voluntary self-regulation.  
 
Aside from setting standards, the instrument will provide for learning and stakeholder 
interaction via its comprehensive development process. Because ISO 26000 is still in its 
infancy, the following report can only provide a preliminary overview of the instrument 
and reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (spring 2008). 
 
Background 
A private, non-profit organization established in 1947, ISO is a network of national 
standards institutes from 157 countries, with a secretariat based in Geneva. In 2001, 
discussions began within ISO as to whether or not it should develop an SR standard.17 
The subsequent debate culminated with the establishment of an ISO Working Group on 
SR and the initiation of the ISO 26000 development process in 2004.  
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The ISO Working Group on SR is composed of experts from ISO members (i.e. national 
standardization bodies) and liaison organisations. ISO members may send up to six 
representatives to the Working Group, while liaison organisations may send two. In 
March 2008, 408 experts and 133 observers from 80 member countries and 40 liaison 
organisations were participating in the Working Group.18 In order to ensure developed 
and developing country representation, the Working Group is jointly led by the 
Brazilian (ABTN) and Swedish (SIS) ISO members. In order to ensure the balanced 
representation of stakeholders in the development process, six main stakeholder groups 
are represented in the Working Group: consumers, government, industry, labour, 
NGOs, and SSRP (service support, research and others). Finally, the Working Group also 
takes geographical and gender-based balance of participants into account. 
 
At the time of writing, work on ISO 26000 was at the second stage of the ISO standard 
development process outlined below:19 
 
Table 1: ISO standard development process 
Stage Working item 
1 A New Work Item Proposal (NWIP) is issued by the ISO Technical Management 
Board (TBM) and approved by ISO members. 
2 A Working Draft (WD) is developed by a Working Group (e.g. the ISO Working 
Group on SR) and circulated among Working Group experts for comments and 
further elabouration. 
3 The Working Group continues its work until a consensus on a Committee Draft 
(CD) is reached. The CD is sent out to all ISO members for comments and 
voting, as well as to participating liaison organisations for comments. 
4 Work on the CD continues until there is agreement to accept it as a Draft 
International Standard (DIS). The DIS is then circulated to the whole 
membership of ISO for a five months commenting and voting period. It 
represents the final possibility to submit modifications. 
5 If the DIS receives a favourable vote from ISO members, it is circulated to them 
again as a Final Draft International Standard (FDIS). The voting period on a 
FDIS is two months and is only for yes/no/abstention vote. 
6 Publication of the final standard. 
 
Where traditionally experts participating in the development of an ISO standard funded 
their own participation, the Working Group on SR identified this practice as a barrier to 
participation by two categories of experts: those from developing countries representing 
government, industry and civil society, as well as those from non-profit organisations 
(e.g. NGOs, think tanks etc.) based in developed countries.20 Thus, a funding mechanism 
for the development of ISO 26000 has been adopted to ensure the broadest possible 
stakeholder engagement.21 The fund’s key objectives are to “(1) ensure balanced 
representation among diverse stakeholders in the development of the ISO 26000, (2) 
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increase and broaden stakeholder involvement to ensure the credibility of the ISO 26000 
and its development process, and (3) enable effective participation in the ISO 26000 
standardization process.”22 Private companies and foundations, as well as other donors, 
such as governments, are invited to contribute to the fund.23  
 
Rationale 
The rationale underlying the work on ISO 26000, including the basic assumptions as to 
why the instrument’s use could change firms’ behaviour, is twofold: First, ISO 26000 
combines the benefits of a common global standard with the expertise and legitimacy 
embodied in the multi-stakeholder approach to its development. ISO is the world-leader 
in the development of international standards and generally only embarks upon the 
development of a new international standard if it responds to market demand. ISO’s 
success in meeting the practical needs of businesses and other organisations is evidenced 
by the thousands of ISO standards already used world-wide. The ISO 26000 standard 
could therefore benefit from the success of other ISO standards. Second, recognizing 
“that social responsibility involves a number of subjects and issues that are qualitatively 
different from the subjects and issues that have traditionally been dealt with by ISO,“24 
ISO has for the first time adopted a multi-stakeholder approach that is meant to ensure 
broad and deep stakeholder engagement throughout the standard development process. 
By doing so, it is expected that the ISO 26000 will be widely accepted by all key 
stakeholders.25 
 
While there are already numerous CSR instruments in existence, the ISO Advisory 
Group on Social Responsibility found that an ISO standard could add value to the 
current instruments landscape. Once agreed, ISO 26000 would be the first global 
international standard on SR. As such, ISO 26000 would provide guidance to 
organisations around the world, facilitating their understanding of the concept of social 
responsibility and its integration into their day-to-day operations. In addition, guidance 
contained in the final document is expected to cover issues ranging from human and 
labour rights to environmental protection, how the various existing standards might be 
understood and linked, and how stakeholders may be engaged and public 
communication undertaken. The ultimate goal and added-value of ISO 26000 is to 
develop an international consensus on what SR means and which SR issues 
organisations need to address, to provide guidelines on how principles can be translated 
into action, and to identify and spread existing SR best practices.26 
 
Content and Implementation 
While ISO 26000 is still being developed, its objectives as an international standard on 
SR have already been defined. Beyond assisting organisations to address their social 
responsibilities, it should provide practical guidance for the operationalization of SR, 
identifying and engaging with stakeholders, and enhancing credibility of reports and 
claims made about SR. Furthermore, ISO 26000 is meant to promote a common 
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terminology in the SR field and to emphasize performance results and improvements. 
Finally, it should be consistent, and not in conflict with existing SR instruments.27 
 
While the structure of ISO 26000 has been agreed, its content is still being negotiated. 
According to the latest Working Draft, the proposed structure is composed of the 
following sections:28 
 
Table 2: Proposed design of ISO 26000 
 Section Description of content of sections 
0 Introduction Gives information on the content of the 
guidance standard and the objectives 
promoting its preparation. 
1 Scope Defines the subjects covered by the guidance 
standard, its coverage and the limits of its 
applicability. 
2 Normative references Lists documents which must be read in 
conjunction with the standard. The inclusion of 
such a section remains subject to review. 
3 Terms and definitions Identifies terms used in the guidance standard 
that require definitions and provides such 
definitions. 
4 Understanding social 
responsibility 
Describes factors, conditions and issues that 
have influenced the development of SR and 
continue to affect its nature and practice. In 
addition, it describes what the concept of social 
responsibility means and how it applies to 
organisations. 
5 Principles of social responsibility Introduces and explains the fundamental 
principles and practices of SR. These are: 
accountability, transparency, ethical conduct, 
recognition of stakeholders and their concerns, 
legal compliance, respect for fundamental 
human rights, respect for international norms. 
6 Practices of social responsibility Introduces and explains the practices of social 
responsibility. Practices are: identifying SR, 
stakeholder identification and engagement, 
integrating SR into the organisation, and 
communication. 
7 Guidance on social responsibility 
core subjects 
Explains the core subjects involved in SR: 
organisational governance, human rights, 
labour practices, the environment, fair 
operating practices, consumer issues, and 
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social and economic development of the 
community. 
8 Guidance for organisations on 
implementing social 
responsibility 
Provides practical guidance on implementing 
and integrating SR practices, e.g. policies, 
practices, approaches, issue identification, 
performance assessment, and communication. 
9 Guidance annexes Annex A: Annex on social responsibility 
initiatives - a comprehensive list of existing SR 
initiatives. 
 Bibliography Includes references that might be useful in 
understanding and implementing SR in an 
organisation. 
 
Questions concerning which organisations and supply chains will adopt ISO 26000, why 
they would do so, and under which circumstances, are yet to be answered. One key 
problem concerning the implementation of the new SR standard is its guidance 
character, i.e. the avoidance of third-party certification.29 Research shows that ISO 
guidance documents are often widely unknown, and their purposes unclear. This could 
reflect on ISO 26000 and hamper its adoption.30 A second possible implementation issue 
concerns the extent to which ISO 26000 will provide benefits to organisations adopting 
the standard. Opinions on the benefits of existing ISO management standards differ, 
ranging from assurances that they are beneficial to claims that their implementation was 
ineffective.31 It remains to be seen whether the implementation of ISO 26000 will in fact 
enhance organisations’ social responsibility. 
 
Policy Discussion and Evaluation 
Literature on ISO 26000 is still rare. The current policy discussion focuses on the 
instrument’s development process, and takes place primarily within the ISO Working 
Group and amongst experts concerned. However, three main issues can be drawn from 
the discussion so far.  
 
The first is whether ISO should engage in the development of an SR standard at all: Is SR 
like other standardization fields? Is a private organisation competent to set SR 
standards, or is it rather an issue of public policy requiring government initiative? The 
report of the ISO Advisory Group on Social Responsibility emphasizes that ISO does not 
have the authority or legitimacy to set social obligations or expectations which are 
properly defined by governments and inter-governmental organisations.32 The report 
underlines that ISO needs to recognize the difference between instruments adopted by 
authoritative global inter-governmental organisations, and private voluntary initiatives 
that may or may not reflect universal principles contained in international treaties and 
conventions.33 Industry representatives, by contrast, oppose the development of a SR 
standard on the grounds that a new management systems standard would impose 
considerable costs on industry. Other stakeholders maintain that SR is a fast-evolving 
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and complex subject, and that it is therefore not feasible to harmonize substantive social 
responsibility commitments.34 In its resolution 35/2004, the TMB acknowledged “that 
social responsibility involves a number of subjects and issues that are qualitatively 
different from the subjects and issues that have traditionally been dealt with by ISO.”35 It 
nevertheless decided that ISO should start developing a SR standard. The adoption of a 
holistic multi-stakeholder approach to the development of the new standard may be 
interpreted as a response to this widely held skepticism, and as a means to create the 
legitimacy necessary for the ISO 26000 project. 
 
Second, the envisioned character of ISO 26000 as a guidance document, as opposed to a 
certifiable standard subject to third-party auditing, is debated. Originally the new SR 
standard was to be developed along the lines of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 management 
system standards, both of which include third-party certification.36 However, the ISO 
Advisory Group on Social Responsibility recommended that a guidance document be 
developed. As indicated above, guidance standards are often widely unknown and their 
purposes tend to be unclear, a fact that could reflect on ISO 26000 and hamper its 
adoption. Accordingly, it has been argued that a standard involving some kind of 
auditing could furnish confidence necessary to upgrade the credibility of the standard. 
 
Third, the role of developing countries in the development of ISO 26000 has obtained 
particular emphasis. While about 70 percent of all ISO members come from developing 
countries, they are usually rather minor actors in the development of new standards. 
ISO sought to account for this disparity in the development of the new standard, which 
partially explains the dual leadership of the Swedish and Brazilian national 
standardization bodies in the development process. The desire to ensure developing 
country representation was also a motivation behind the establishment of the ISO SR 
Trust Fund. At the 2004 ISO Conference in Stockholm it was argued that ISO 
engagement in the area of SR would actually ensure the participation of developing 
countries in devising a new standard on SR; should ISO not move forward, the work 
would be taken up by other private initiatives that probably would not support the 
participation of developing countries to the same degree.37 ISO has gained a reputation 
for being highly supportive developing country participation in the development of the 
new standard. 
 
One of the objectives of ISO 26000 is to be consistent, and not in conflict, with existing SR 
standards and requirements. Amid the plethora of existing CSR instruments, it is 
intended to generate consensus on what SR means, and to provide guidance on how 
organisations can actually translate SR principles into action. Likely success on this 
objective is reinfoced by the fact that many organisations already very active in the field 
of CSR and sustainable development, such as the UN, the OECD, GRI, SAI, and 
AccountAbility, are participating in the development of the standard. Likewise, ISO has 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and the United Nations Global Compact Office (UNGCO) to enhance their 
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cooperation in the development of the future ISO 26000 standard.38 While the 
participation of other key CSR advocates might be explained by them wanting to 
protect, at least in part, their own interests,39 it also underlines their interest in the 
development of the standard. At this stage of the process, no direct competition between 
ISO 26000 and other already existing initiatives can be identified. However, much will 
depend on the final product’s design, as interaction effects with other instruments have 
yet to be seen. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Still in its early stages, ISO 26000 is a promising instrument in the area of SR. Its 
development has been undertaken in a transparent manner, involving a large number of 
stakeholders, representing a plethora of interests – all important to ensure the legitimacy 
of the final product. If it meets its own ambitions – i.e. of creating consensus on what SR 
is and providing guidance how SR can be implemented in practice – the standard could 
indeed add value to the landscape of existing instruments. But it remains too early to 
make any final judgments. 
 
Much will depend on the extent to which the chosen approach to standardization – that 
is, as a guidance standard as opposed to a standard requiring third-party certification – 
can have real impact on firms’ behaviour. As a guidance instrument, ISO 26000 risks 
becoming like other guidance standards: a document undermined by low credibility and 
eroded confidence. It therefore seems necessary for the new standard to find some 
means besides third-party certification to ensure that it is not misused. Only then will it 
enjoy the confidence and credibility ratings it needs to live up to its expectations. 
 
Further research is needed to fully assess the instrument. The following areas of inquiry 
are recommended in particular:40 
• In order to shed more light on the role of ISO 26000 in the SR field, studies into its 
likely diffusion patterns – with particular emphasis on which organisations may be 
expected to adopt the standard, why, and under which circumstances – would be 
useful. 
• Given that ISO 26000 is intended as a guidance standard, research on its ability to 
influence the socially responsible behaviour of organisations would yield valuable 
insights into its potential effectiveness. Such research might also help determine 
whether the standard carries any value for the organisations that adopt it. 
• Finally, future research should also focus on how ISO 26000 actually fits and interacts 
with other CSR initiatives. This would help determine if it indeed adds value to 
existing initiatives, and if so, how and to what extent. 
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United Nations Global Compact 
 
Henry Haaker 
 
On January 31, 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced the creation of the 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) at the World Economic Forum. The 
announcement came as a reaction to cases of child labour, disregard of environmental 
standards, and other human rights abuses in developing countries, which showed that 
companies from developed countries did not uphold their home countries’ standards 
when operating abroad. Due to global supply chains, the classical nation state had lost 
its capacity to monitor and enforce labour, environmental and human rights standards 
across borders. Secretary General Annan argued that multinational companies, 
governments, public sector entities, cities and other societal stakeholders carry 
responsibility for the development of globalization – it was up to them to ensure that 
less advantaged parts of the world benefit as much as the developed world. Hence, a 
new international, multi-stakeholder approach was needed to tackle the problem. 
 
Conceived as a means to react to the growing challenges of globalisation and 
liberalisation and their unequal distribution around the world, the UNGC was officially 
launched on July 26, 2000. It derives its normative foundation from four major 
international treaties: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO’s Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development and the UN Convention Against Corruption. Based on these treaties, the 
UNGC is founded on ten guiding principles: 
 
Human Rights 
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights; and 
Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
Labour Standards 
Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and 
Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
Environment 
Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental 
challenges; 
Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and 
Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies. 
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Anti-Corruption 
Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including 
extortion and bribery.41 
 
The UNGC is a learning forum where societal actors can exchange best practices, 
develop common standards, organize themselves in local networks and engage in 
regional and sectoral partnership projects. The aim is a continuous process of learning 
and improving working conditions for the sustainable conduct of business.  
 
In 2007, UNGC headquarters in New York wielded an annual budget of USD 8.1 
million, of which USD 4.5 million consisted of in-kind donations.42 The money is raised 
through the Foundation for the Global Compact, a non-profit organisation founded in 
2006 to help raise funds from countries, companies, unions and private donors. Most of 
the donations come from the developed world. 
 
Implementation 
The UNGC is a purely voluntary institution with no direct regulatory power. The main 
strategies for influencing decision makers involve policy dialogues, mutual learning, 
local network and partnership projects (e.g. advocacy and awareness raising, social 
investment and philanthropy, and core business). The only element of the UNGC that 
could be understood as constituting a soft monitoring mechanism is the so-called COPs 
(Communication in Progress) mechanism, by which businesses inform their 
stakeholders of their progress and best practices. Every UNGC member must agree to 
submit at least one annual COP. However, COPs are not verified by the UNGC office, 
and companies alone have access to the information proving that improvements 
reported are indeed achieved.  
 
More than 5,200 participants (including 4,000 companies and 120 countries) had joined 
the UNGC at the time of writing, and the number is constantly growing. This makes the 
UNGC the CSR tool with the biggest and most diverse membership. Participants come 
from the business world (individual companies and associations), labour unions, civil 
society groups, academic institutions, the public sector, cities and six UN agencies 
(OHCHR, ILO, UNEP, UNODC, UNDP and UNIDO). Generally speaking, most UN 
countries are represented in at least one of these groups. Nevertheless, there is some 
divide along development levels. Members from emerging and developing countries 
constitute a majority of stakeholders in most branches, except among national civil 
society actors. This is not surprising since these members are responsible for the biggest 
share of the world economy, as well as for a majority of violations of UNGC standards 
in their chains of production and business activities abroad.  
 
Participants meet and discuss on specific topics irregularly, develop common guidelines, 
form alliances to tackle common problems and learn from each others’ best practices. All 
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actions and partnerships have to focus on beneficial sustainable outcomes for the 
developing world.  
 
Policy Discussion and Evaluation 
Is the UNGC a success? The question is difficult to answer, as impact is hard to measure. 
A study by McKinsey43 (an important UNGC donor) and the Global Policy Forum44 finds 
a positive correlation between sustainable business conduct and membership in the 
UNGC. Of the companies questioned, 40 percent stated that the UNGC had impacted 
their business behaviour. But 34 percent of those claim the changes would have 
happened anyway and the UNGC only facilitated and accelerated the process. Changes 
included measures to counteract discrimination in human resources departments and 
discussions about human rights considerations or the implementation of partnership 
projects. Asked whether they changed their suppliers or undertook other drastic 
changes in their business operations, a relatively small number of business leaders 
responded positively. This was true both outside OECD countries (2nd deciles) and 
inside OECD countries (3rd deciles).  
 
Another way to assess the impact of the UNGC involves testing whether there is a 
correlation between consumer behaviour toward companies and their membership in 
the UNGC, which would indirectly incentivize companies to join the UNGC. This seems 
to be intuitively true, at least for companies in very brand- and consumer-sensitive 
markets. GlobeScan, a UNGC member and international opinion survey institute, 
studied this relationship.45 They found that for 75 percent of the global population the 
image of a company increases once it is associated with the UNGC.46 
 
Critics of the UNGC, however, dispel the notion that UNGC membership automatically 
translates into positive change. A number of NGOs (e.g. Greenpeace47, ActionAid,48 
CorpWatch,49 SOMO,50 Berne Delegation,51 and Human Rights Watch52) have exposed 
cases of companies participating in the UNGC violating its principles. These critics 
disapprove of the voluntary and non-binding nature of the Compact. They demand 
stronger monitoring, more honest communication about failures and a decrease in false 
promises. They insist on the necessity of an enforcement mechanism and have suggested 
that members of the UNGC be made accountable for pressuring countries in which they 
operate to sign relevant international treaties. They also argue that every COP with a list 
of planed improvements should be accompanied by an implementation timetable.  
 
John G. Ruggie, former chief advisor for strategic planning to Kofi Annan and one of the 
minds behind the Compact, counters these criticisms. He sees the world in a new era of 
globalisation, which needs to be better mediated and regulated, but lacks an agency 
competent to do so. The Secretary General, he maintains, would not have been able to 
get hard legislation through the UN General Assembly and does not have the capacity to 
monitor international businesses, not to mention all their branches and subcontractors. 
An additional barrier to legislation is that businesses would instinctively object to such 
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measures if attempted. Ruggie contends that private companies have to take up some of 
the responsibility for socially responsible globalization, and sees the UNGC as an 
attempt to motivate them to do so. He argues that a learning network is an effective and 
modern tool for international governance, and provides the most likely means to reach a 
consensual understanding of CSR. 53   
 
Beyond his pragmatism, Ruggie also sees a “stronger intellectual case” to be made for 
the UNGC.54 First, since there is no consensus about CSR practices, the blanks in the 
debate will be gradually filled by businesses themselves. Second, he expects that instead 
of simply adhering to formal criteria – as they would be likely to do if subjected to hard 
legislation – businesses under the voluntary regime will be prompted to internalize a 
broader understanding of CSR into their corporate culture. This would engender a much 
more lasting and effective impact of UNGC ideals. Finally, “the accumulation of 
experience itself is likely to lead gradually to a desire for greater codification, 
benchmarking and moving from ‘good’ to ‘best’ practices.”55 Over seven years since the 
initiation of the UNGC, with more than 5,000 participants, proof of those assumptions 
and prognoses has yet to surface. 
 
Steve Waddell perceives the Compact as a “new organisational form […] a global action 
network (GAN).”56 According to Waddell, a GAN is the perfect structure to deal with 
complex multi-stakeholder issues on a global scale. He identifies a number of challenges 
facing the operation of GANs. The first is a clear definition of stakeholders; the diversity 
of stakeholders should be taken into account, and there needs to be an intrinsic 
normative motivation for actors to work together. This should be easily fulfilled since 
the UNGC is based solely on values. Waddell sees three main stages (with 12 sub stages) 
of GAN development: issue definition, solution design and implementation. Waddell 
argues that the Compact is still stuck somewhere between issue definition and solution 
design, as the general principles are clearly defined but need to be made more concrete 
if they are to become part of the solution. The solution design is also still in the making, 
as evidenced by widespread protest amongst crucial stakeholders, i.e. NGOs.  
 
GANs need to “develop four competences […] if they are to be effective”: participation, 
ethics and values, operations and communications.57 The first competence entails that 
GANs need to influence a sufficient number of participants in order to have an impact 
on the whole market/society/universe of potential actors. This is clearly achieved with 
the UNGC. The second core competence, ethics and values, seems also to exist within 
the UNGC, but here the gap between promises and reality needs to be bridged.58 The 
operations competence highlights the importance of connecting the vast amount of data 
collected by the UNGC in order to make it useful for internal and external users. The 
Compact runs the danger of becoming the victim of its own popularity; the 
overwhelming number of participants, with their COPs and other data, might be too 
much to handle in a useful manner. The final competence concerns the GAN in its role 
as a facilitator that makes it possible for all stakeholders to communicate with one 
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another. Waddell contends that the Compact so far performs quite successfully in this 
domain.  
 
In sum, the UNGC is, due to its high number of participants from many sectors and 
countries, one of the most legitimate tools for the articulation and development of 
international standards for CSR. It is also the most adaptable tool prepared for future 
learning processes in the field, and provides one of the most useful normative 
foundations for a modern understanding of CSR. On the other hand, the UNGC lacks, 
by its own intention, an effective monitoring and enforcement mechanism.  
 
Recommendations 
The UNGC should continue to pursue and intensify its co-operations with other CSR 
institutions mentioned in this handbook. By doing so, it can make their standards more 
usable in practice than they are today. Policy dialogues, regional co-operations and 
partnerships should be pursued, in order to concretize the ten principles for application 
in specific regions and sectors and in view of developing a set of best practices and 
specific standards for various regions and sectors. Such specialized formulations of the 
UNGC principles would make their application much more feasible in practice.  
 
Even though the UN claims that UNGC membership does not certify perfect adherence 
by all participating companies, it should adopt measures to discourage companies from 
using their membership as a marketing instrument without complying. The COP 
initiative is useful for supervising improvements and developments in companies’ 
behavior, but should be monitored by external auditors. Such auditors should be 
commissioned by the UNGC office, but paid for by the companies. In this manner, the 
UNGC can ensure that only truthful COPs get published on its website. In addition, the 
UN should publicly list the wrongdoings of companies that do not adhere to their 
commitments. The categorization of participants that stop communicating about their 
progress as “non-communicating companies” on the homepage does not suffice.  
 
The immense expertise within the UNGC network offers an opportune source of criteria 
and standards for good monitoring and enforcement. Policy dialogues involving all 
stakeholders should be used to develop a guidebook on how to effectively monitor and 
enforce UNGC compliance.59 Such a guidebook could in turn serve participants or 
external experts as a blueprint for the effective monitoring of their companies.  
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Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative 
 
Natalya Pak 
 
Concerns about the practices of big corporations operating in countries blessed by 
natural resources have become part and parcel of the CSR agenda. Observers noting the 
enormous economic and social powers wielded by large multinationals are bewildered 
by the fact that these companies are no longer deterred by territorial and legal barriers.60 
The debate surrounding oil and gas companies operating in countries whose 
governments are corrupt and politically unstable is particularly acute.  
 
Corruption is one of the major causes of poverty, human rights violations, 
environmental degradation, and violence. In the extractive industries, corruption and 
mismanagement are endemic. Companies in these industries commonly bribe state 
officials, and governments frequently lower environmental and human rights standards 
and engage in other corrupt practices in order to attract foreign investors. These 
problems are not the sole responsibility of resource-rich developing countries, but also a 
concern for the developed world. Meeting the challenge involves engagement by the 
public sector and the private sector alike. This realization has prompted discussions 
amongst governments and civil society keen on developing solutions to the problems of 
corruption in the extractive industries. 
 
History of the instrument 
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) began as an upshot of Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP), a coalition of 120 NGOs led by the UK-based NGO Global 
Witness.61 In 2002, around the same time that the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank began addressing transparency issues in lending to resource-rich countries, 
Global Witness initiated dialogues with major British oil companies, requesting them to 
publish what they pay to governments in countries in which they operate.62  
 
Many companies took interest in PWYP’s calls for disclosure on the grounds that the 
promotion of public accountability could improve political stability in host countries. 
But their enthusiasm came with a number of caveats. Companies worried that disclosure 
of payments could put them at a competitive disadvantage. Many also found themselves 
constrained by confidentiality provisions in their contracts with host governments, 
which prohibited them from disclosing certain types of information without the 
government’s consent.63 It became clear that governmental support would be needed to 
push the initiative forward.  
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Supported by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair, the British Government stepped in, 
creating a multi-stakeholder dialogue involving other governments, leading NGOs, 
international organisations (including the IMF and the World Bank), and oil companies. 
The parties were asked to work together to develop a framework for revenue 
transparency. The outcome of these dialogues was the launch of EITI at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2002.  
 
On June 17, 2003, the British Government held a conference on EITI, where its 12 
Principles were developed and announced. The Principles are the following:64 
 
1. The shared belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative 
economic and social impacts; 
2. An affirmation that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a 
country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the 
interests of their national development; 
3. Recognition that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams 
over many years and can be highly price dependent; 
4. Recognition that a public understanding of government revenues and 
expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and 
realistic options for sustainable development; 
5. Underlining the importance of transparency by governments and companies in 
the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and 
accountability; 
6. Recognition that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context 
of respect for contracts and law; 
7. Recognition of the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct 
investment that financial transparency may bring; 
8. Belief in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all citizens 
for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditures; 
9. Commitment to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability 
in public life, government operations and in business; 
10. Belief that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of 
payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use; 
11. Belief that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive 
industry companies operating in that country; 
12. Belief that all stakeholders have important and relevant contributions to make – 
including governments and their agencies, extractive industry companies, service 
companies, multilateral organisations, financial organisations, investors, and non-
governmental organisations. 
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In sum, the EITI Principles hold that the disclosure and publication of companies’ 
payments and of governments’ revenues from oil, gas, and mining can enhance 
accountability and reduce corruption in resource-rich countries. 
 
Instrument Rationale  
There are several reasons for the adoption and support of EITI.  
 
For companies, participation in EITI is a means to be recognised as good corporate 
citizens. Another advantage is the fact that companies and governments adhering to 
EITI are discouraged from paying and accepting bribes, which is in companies’ 
economic interest.   
 
For host governments, EITI offers a means to establish a favourable investment climate. 
Countries prone to corruption, internal conflict and political and social instability are 
less attractive to foreign investors. Countries in which governments are committed to 
transparency and accountability are perceived as being more stable, both economically 
and politically. 
   
Increasing transparency also implies increasing governments’ accountability toward the 
citizens whose interests they are meant to defend. Thus, EITI also serves the interests of 
NGOs and civil society groups acting on behalf of citizens and advocating their rights. 
 
A ‘Voluntary’ Approach 
A major characteristic of the Publish What You Pay initiative was its insistence on 
‘mandatory’ disclosure of companies’ payments to host governments. EITI, by contrast, 
opted for a voluntary approach, given country-specific requirements for its 
implementation. It is considered ‘voluntary’ because states choose whether or not to 
endorse it. However, a closer reading of the EITI criteria reveals a number of 
‘mandatory’ provisions within the initiative. The six EITI criteria, which serve countries 
and companies as guidelines for EITI implementation, are the following:65 
 
1. Regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining payments by companies to 
governments and all material revenues received by governments from oil, gas and 
mining companies to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and 
comprehensible manner; 
2. Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues are the subject of 
a credible, independent audit, applying international auditing standards; 
3. Payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible, independent administrator, 
applying international auditing standards and with publication of the administrator’s 
opinion regarding that reconciliation including discrepancies, should any be identified; 
4. This approach is extended to all companies including state-owned enterprises; 
5. Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring and 
evaluation of this process and contributes towards public debate; 
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6. A public, financially sustainable work plan for all the above is developed by the 
host government, with assistance from the international financial institutions where 
required, including measurable targets, a timetable for implementation, and an 
assessment of potential capacity constraints. 
 
While it is at the discretion of governments to develop and introduce their own model of 
implementation,66 the criteria require a government endorsing EITI to ensure that 
companies in the extractive industries regularly submit payment data for independent 
audit and publication. Hence, when a country implements EITI it becomes mandatory de 
facto for the companies operating within its borders to ‘publish what they pay’ to the 
government, in exchange for the right to extract natural resources. The government must 
similarly publish information about the revenues it receives. 
 
Implementation 
There are three major stages of EITI implementation: initiation, implementation and 
review. 
 
Initiation begins when a country endorses EITI. It involves engagement between the 
government and various stakeholders, which should agree on a working plan. All 
necessary arrangements should then be made to put revenue transparency into practice.  
 
In the implementation stage, a country should be able to demonstrate that a legal or 
regulatory framework for revenue transparency is established. Revenues should be 
regularly published in ‘a credible and comprehensible manner’.  
 
In the third stage, review, states and other stakeholders should review EITI 
implementation, taking new circumstances and experiences into consideration in view 
of making improvements.  
 
Countries which are participants of EITI but have not yet fully implemented its criteria 
are considered candidate countries. Countries which have fully implemented EITI and 
are able to demonstrate compliance with its 20 indicators are deemed compliant.67 A 
country should become compliant within two years of becoming a candidate.  
 
Once a country is compliant, it should be assessed by an independent validator every 
five years. The EITI Board,68 through its Secretariat, monitors the validation process and 
reviews/assesses Validation Reports. If the board assesses that a country has met all 
criteria it is designated as EITI Compliant. Alternatively, if the Validation Report reveals 
that the country has not made any meaningful progress, its candidate status may be 
revoked. Notwithstanding the significant progress demonstrated by some candidates,69 
no country has yet attained status as EITI Compliant.  
 
Obstacles to Implementation 
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Research has identified four main obstacles facing EITI implementation: first, lack of 
political will amongst candidates to become compliant; second, legal problems 
associated with implementation; third, lack of enforcement and monitoring; and fourth, 
problems associated with civil society involvement. These obstacles are detailed below. 
 
Full implementation of EITI relies on political will in candidate countries. States must be 
truly interested in coordinating companies’ behaviour for the initiative to carry any 
clout. When this condition holds, and there is constructive dialogue between 
government and industry leaders, voluntary standards can be sufficient to ensure 
company compliance. Unfortunately, such progress is often undermined by states or 
particular elite groups with vested interests in retaining ambiguity around extractive 
industry revenues.  
 
According to the fourth EITI criterion, ‘all companies including state-owned enterprises’ 
should disclose revenue information. However, EITI does not specify how disclosure 
should be carried out. Moreover, contracts between companies and host governments in 
extractive industries typically contain confidentiality clauses prohibiting financial 
information disclosure. Thus, in order to meet requirements it may be necessary to 
adopt new laws or regulations. This can prove a major challenge, especially in 
developing countries where governments may be corrupt or autocratic. 
 
Civil society involvement is crucial to ensure that all stakeholder interests are taken into 
account during implementation. It is also instrumental for effective monitoring and 
evaluation. However, in many countries civil society may be restricted from taking part 
in these processes. For example, civil society activists may not be willing to participate 
for fear of reprisal, lack of resources or capacity. Such barriers undermine the legitimacy 
of EITI commitments in such states.  
 
Scope of the instrument  
EITI is unique in its mandate and the scope of its application since it addresses a very 
specific issue in a very specific business sector. EITI therefore has direct implications for 
resource-rich countries, and does not compete with other instruments. Its applicability is 
perhaps best evidenced by the broad support it has received. 
 
Developing countries participating in EITI include Azerbaijan, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago.70 
 
Governments in developed countries, including Australia, UK, USA, France, Germany, 
Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada and Belgium support the initiative either 
through direct financial contributions to the EITI Secretariat or support to implementing 
countries.71 
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Companies having endorsed the EITI Principles include: British Petroleum, Chevron 
Corporation, Exxon Mobil, Mitsubishi Materials, Rio Tinto, Shell, Total and others.72  
 
Institutional investors and international organisations have also signed onto EITI. These 
include the World Bank, IMF, OECD, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), and over 70 global investment institutions managing over USD 
13.2 trillion.73 
 
Finally, a range of NGOs also support EITI. These include: Global Witness, Open Society 
Institute, Publish What You Pay Coalition, Transparency International, Human Rights 
Watch, and others.74 
 
Recommendations  
As noted earlier, one of the major problems currently facing EITI is the slow pace at 
which endorsing countries have been backing their commitments with concrete action. 
Meanwhile, these countries have often used their affiliation with EITI to help further 
their political and economic purposes. Possible ramifications of this exploitation of the 
EITI ‘brand’, if not hastily addressed, include the loss of credibility of EITI and a 
slowdown in civil society engagement. This has the potential to drive full 
implementation of the initiative out of reach.  
 
The recommendations below are envisioned to improve EITI: 
 
Provide technical and financial assistance to governments implementing EITI. 
Governments endorsing EITI typically lack adequate resources and suffer from weak 
government structures. Therefore, financial assistance from developed countries and 
international institutions like IMF and the World Bank could be used to support EITI 
implementation. Accompanied by appropriate accountability mechanisms, such 
contributions would also raise recipient countries’ commitments and political will 
toward EITI. Technical support may be provided by means of information sharing on 
best practices and/or trainings. 
 
Encourage governments to promote adequate civil society involvement. As long as 
governments repress interested civil society groups, attempts to implement EITI will 
remain futile.75 EITI and international institutions should encourage governments to 
support civil society involvement. The IMF and the World Bank could pressure 
governments to dialogue with civil society via conditionalities on future financial 
support. EITI could support the engagement of local civil society groups by financing 
their research and full participation in the EITI implementation process. 
 
Encourage governments to establish accountability mechanisms. Although the main 
objective of the EITI is to promote transparency surrounding the revenues earned by 
governments through the sale of natural resources, governments must be held 
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accountable for the mismanagement of such revenues. Hence, appropriate 
accountability mechanisms should be researched and established. 
 
Encourage other countries and companies to promote revenue transparency. EITI’s 
reach should be extended beyond the governments implementing the initiative. 
Companies involved in natural resource extraction and the countries in whose 
jurisdictions they are established should also be encouraged to promote EITI’s 
principles. This would strengthen mutual commitments.  
 
 
 
THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE 
 
Nora Gatewood 
 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a non-profit foundation, is the pioneer of the most 
widely used sustainability reporting framework. Published in 2006, the G3 Guidelines 
are the cornerstone of GRI’s reporting framework. They outline principles and indicators 
by which organisations can measure and report on their economic, environmental and 
social performance. Describing the Guidelines as a “free public good,” the GRI is a self-
regulatory tool for Non-Financial Reporting (NFR).   
 
History 
GRI was established in 1997 as a joint project of the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES), a multi-stakeholder coalition aimed at making 
companies more accountable to social and environmental concerns, and the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP). According to CERES, GRI’s mission was to 
develop “globally applicable guidelines for reporting on the economic, environmental, 
and social performance of corporations, governments and non-governmental 
organisations.”76  
 
Two years after its inception, GRI published its first guidelines. These were initially 
tested by 20 companies, including General Motors, Procter and Gamble, Novo Nordisk, 
and Shell International.77 In the same year, the CSR movement gained momentum when 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan urged corporations worldwide to "embrace, support 
and enact a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, and 
environmental practices.”78 The GRI galvanized international attention in 2002 at the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Shortly thereafter, it 
incorporated as an independent non-profit organisation in Amsterdam. 
 
Governance and Funding 
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GRI’s governance structure encompasses a board of Directors, a stakeholder council, 
technical advisors, organisational stakeholders and a small secretariat. As a multi-
stakeholder initiative, the GRI is funded primarily by its organisational stakeholders, 
which also participate in the development of the guidelines. GRI receives additional 
funding for specific projects like the G3, as well as grants and in-kind donations from 
countries, organisations and foundations. 
  
Rationale 
Although many companies use NFR as a PR tool, GRI’s objective is to increase 
organisational learning and prioritize CSR concerns within companies. According to a 
report by the Berlin-based think tank, Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), the “initial 
driver behind NFR is stakeholder pressure on companies to become more transparent 
and accountable about their environmental and social behavior.”79 The report also 
highlights that NFR helps companies manage their non-financial risks. Finally, the 
“compliance factor” – which argues that companies want to comply with adopted 
guidelines and procedures, even if they are voluntary – is another key rationale 
underlying NFR.  
 
At the core of GRI’s rationale is its multi-stakeholder approach. Multi-stakeholder input 
and endorsement ensures a usable, industry- and country-specific tool for NFR and, 
crucially, legitimizes the tool for companies. Given that NFR is voluntary for companies 
in most countries, organisational stakeholders have a specific incentive to jointly 
develop guidelines which they feel comfortable implementing in their CSR strategy.  
 
 
In sum, the rationale behind GRI is twofold: first, self-interest relating to PR, strategic 
brand placement and risk assessment; and second, multi-stakeholder development of 
the guidelines as a means to legitimize GRI in target organisations. Appropriately 
Why are companies interested? Why does it work? 
Owner / Stakeholder pressure  The “compliance factor.” 
Improved assessment of non-financial risks.  
 
The multi-stakeholder approach fosters 
buy-in, trust & legitimacy. 
PR, Brand development & differentiation 
 
GRI offers a usable, industry and 
country-specific tool for NFR. 
 
First mover advantage in developing 
guidelines 
 
Increases credibility, consistency, & 
comparability of CSR activities 
 
Management tool for sustainability 
benchmarking & costing   
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constituted, NFR reporting mechanisms force companies to pay greater attention to the 
effects of their activities on environmental, social and labour issues. 
 
GRI in the CSR Landscape 
NFR has gained increasing precedence over the past decade, amid an impressive 
profusion of CSR tools and their scope. Within the increasingly complex CSR landscape, 
GRI has emerged as the leader in NFR. This is owed to the fact that the GRI Guidelines 
provide a unique, turn-key solution for NFR: they are universal enough for 
implementation across industries, yet their Sector Supplements and Protocols and 
National Annexes provide custom-fit solutions. An additional feature is that, unlike 
stronger instruments which include sanction mechanisms or legal direction, GRI 
reporting is completely voluntary, as is the information provided within the reports.  
 
One advantage of GRI’s approach is that it bridges gaps left in the CSR landscape by 
other leading instruments. As Georg Kell points out, “embracing the same international 
conventions, the Global Compact and the GRI are complementary. One defines values 
and operational principles for sustainable development; the latter, a disclosure 
framework that provides organisations a practical basis to communicate their 
sustainability performance. Now, under the G3, there is a greater foundation for 
convergence and user-friendliness between the two.”80 
 
Dissemination  
The GRI stakeholder network encompasses more than 1,500 companies in over 60 
countries. However, although the GRI Guidelines are a global tool they are mostly used 
by MNCs based in OECD countries.81 A 2005 KPMG study highlights that the majority 
of companies participating in NFR are based in the USA, UK and Japan. But it also 
indicates a trend emerging in developing countries, particularly South Africa and 
Brazil.82 This trend has identifiable sources: the South African government recently 
imposed NFR requirements on publicly listed companies, while companies in Brazil, 
increasingly concerned with brand development, have been capitalizing on CSR in an 
environment of rather lax regulation and extreme disparity in wealth distribution.83  
 
Unsurprisingly, those sectors with the highest environmental impacts publish the 
highest number of GRI reports.  These include utilities, oil and gas, trade and retail, but 
also the financial sector, which is a leader in NFR.84 The dominance of the financial 
sector perhaps signifies interests beyond stakeholder pressure: GRI sustainability 
reports are increasingly used by investors to gauge individual companies’ risk positions. 
  
NFR has increased significantly in the last decade. GPPi states that reports have 
increased from 50 to 1,902 between 1992 and 2005. A clear majority of these involve 
reporting according to GRI Guidelines.85 Further, several governments, the EU, OECD, 
UN, and the World Economic Forum have referenced the GRI Guidelines to their 
constituents. The GRI’s communication network includes 20 thousand stakeholders.   
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Academic studies  
In a 2002 study on the usefulness of the GRI Guidelines in Swedish companies’ 
communication, Carl-Johan Hedberg and Fredrik von Malmborg found that reporting 
itself, and the GRI Guidelines in particular, are more important for internal than for 
external communication. This may indicate that NFR is achieving its objective of 
organisational learning, but it also raises questions about the usefulness of NFR outside 
of organisations. While financial reports provide easily disseminated data of profits and 
losses, NFR has yet to develop strong indicators and benchmarks which are useful to 
readers and can be compared across sectors.  
 
In 2005, Alan Willis identified one of GRI’s key challenges: how could GRI accommodate 
the broad variety of disclosure needs and the expectations of a wide range of report 
users and company stakeholders, while still remaining relevant and specific enough to 
ensure comparability? This raises a critical issue for GRI’s continued success; that is, the 
need to broaden the tool’s audience to include consumers and investors, and to provide 
intelligible benchmarks for industry cohorts.  
 
Policy Discussion  
The policy discussion on CSR is broad. The concept of CSR itself, the advantages of 
regulation versus the organisational learning approach, and the emergence of CSR in the 
context of globalisation are among the issues most debated. The following paragraphs 
highlight the main topics occupying the policy discussion on GRI: 
 
Multi-stakeholder approach 
The success of GRI can be directly linked to its multi-stakeholder approach. NGOs 
commend the GRI for facilitating dialogue between diverse actors affected by business 
activities, and for engaging them in the mutual development of sustainability reporting 
guidelines. From the business and industry perspective, this approach is the source of 
GRI’s legitimacy and heightens the guidelines’ relevance for specific sectors. 
 
The glossy brochure 
NGOs frequently accuse companies of using GRI reporting for PR and “window 
dressing” purposes. Proving their point, they have cited numerous examples of 
unethical behaviour by companies boasting their social responsibility standards in 
glossy sustainability reports.86 The extent of organisational learning through NFR often 
depends on the location of the CSR department within the organisation. If situated in the 
communications or PR department, CSR activities and GRI reports in particular may be 
exploited for brand development and differentiation. Policymakers and business 
proponents stress that if CSR is to be taken seriously by a company and integrated into 
its business case and overall culture, CSR departments should be moved to the executive 
level and made a responsibility of operations managers or even the board.87 Where 
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sustainability reporting is integrated into operations and executive demands, CSR 
activities have a greater chance of becoming part of everyday transactions. 
 
Future growth uncertainties 
A recent report commissioned by the UNEP is pessimistic about GRI’s future prospects. 
It forwards several reasons for this, the most critical being a decreasing growth trend in 
NFR. Contributing to this is the fact that NFR remains a niche practice, primarily 
performed by MNCs in OECD countries. Even among MNCs, only five percent of 
companies report according to the GRI, and within the OECD, reporting is prevalent in 
only a few countries: USA, UK and Japan.88 The lack of participation by SMEs and 
developing countries is a source of concern. In most countries, SMEs contribute far more 
to national economies in terms of income and jobs than large multinationals. In 
Germany, for example, about 99 percent of companies are SMEs. While many SMEs 
practice corporate citizenship-type activities in the areas of employee training, health 
and safety, and employment growth, many lack the required financial and human 
resources to implement CSR tools, especially reporting. Developing countries also pose a 
challenge for GRI growth since they often lack appropriate regulatory frameworks, and 
wide income disparities offer companies a broad range for CSR implementation. Still, 
GRI’s growth curve has recently leveled amid new measures targeting SMEs and 
developing countries.89 
 
Usefulness 
Policy analysts question the usefulness of GRI and NFR in general. Many business actors 
and academics argue that CSR is “old wine in a new bottle.”90 This attitude may prevent 
companies from implementing new CSR tools, particularly NFR according to GRI, since 
companies believe they already uphold CSR values. Another concern is that 
”mainstream investment analysts – contrary to popular belief among NFR advocates – 
do not care about non-financial issues.”91 However, this view seems to ignore the 
emerging popularity of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI). A final concern is that 
while the G3 Guidelines offer a standard for NFR and establish a format facilitating 
comparison of reports among industry cohorts, the reports fall short of indicating how 
sustainably companies are operating. GRI has recognized this critical shortcoming and 
prioritized SME and financial market usefulness as areas of future concentration.  
 
Users 
One challenge raised above concerns GRI’s ability to accommodate the broad variety of 
disclosure needs and expectations of a wide range of report users and company 
stakeholders, while still remaining relevant and specific enough to ensure comparability. 
The question, in short, is whether GRI should expand in scope or concentrate on its 
sectoral expertise? Obviously, if GRI wants to remain the standard for NFR, it needs to 
do both. Through its extensive multi-stakeholder network, GRI is well positioned to 
accomplish this feat. But it will need to improve its reporting guidelines to do so 
successfully. It will also need to find new users for its reports. While the GRI only 
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publishes guidelines on reporting, and can’t guarantee quality of individual reports, GRI 
could develop guidelines for summary reports for benchmarks and comparable 
indicators to target new stakeholders and actors. These could be disseminated to new 
audiences, such as consumers, the financial sector and industry cohorts. Finally, it has 
also been suggested that government ministries and international organisations should 
report according to the GRI Guidelines. This practice has been increasingly common 
among public entities striving to lead by example in the sustainability and CSR area, and 
constitutes a valuable addition to the GRI network.92  
 
Underdeveloped assurance process 
Another policy discussion centers on the GRI reports’ assurance process; in other words, 
assuring that what is in the reports is actually implemented and impacts a company’s 
sustainability performance. While consultancies are becoming increasingly specialized 
in this area, and most companies utilize independent auditors to proof their reports, the 
non-financial content of GRI reports makes assurance difficult. How can GRI help 
companies implement a CSR strategy with tangible results, which is rational and 
efficient, while avoiding a plethora of strategies which make it almost impossible to 
focus efforts? One option for GRI could be the development of industry-specific best 
practices and efficiency indicators. These could be reported in a simple and 
straightforward manner that showcases the best strategies for enhancing companies’ (or 
sectors’) competitive advantage. This would provide a way to rank initiatives. It would 
also improve “CSR-returns” by allowing other companies to adopt established best 
practices. 
 
Recommendations 
The GRI is an important CSR tool due to its vast stakeholder base and implementation 
scope. Its current development priorities showcase the organisation’s ability to address 
challenges. Whether or not NFR becomes mandatory in the future, as a tool for 
organisational learning it is central to institutionalizing CSR in organisations.  
 
The following recommendations are envisioned as means to improve the GRI in view of 
ensuring its continued growth and relevance: 
 
Organisational learning should become a measurable indicator or otherwise 
benchmarked in GRI reports. 
• Develop internal organisational mechanisms for the dissemination of GRI reports to 
ensure the entire organisation is aware of and following sustainability developments; 
• Develop sophisticated assurance mechanisms both within the organisation as well as 
externally in audit companies. 
 
GRI’s continued relevance should be secured and improved by broadening the 
usefulness of the reports for other actors/stakeholders. 
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• Develop summary reports showcasing indicator developments over time and in 
comparison across industry cohorts; 
• Summary reports should target new audiences including consumers, the financial 
sector and industry cohorts.  
 
Current priorities on SME’s and emerging economies should be reinforced by the 
development of appropriate guidelines and benchmarks. 
• GRI should engage its stakeholder base in view of establishing broad partnerships 
with SME’s and emerging economies, defining CSR priority areas, and developing 
sector-specific benchmarks for CSR activities; 
• GRI Guidelines should be adapted for application in emerging economies and SME’s. 
 
GRI should reaffirm its relevance in CSR. 
• GRI’s stakeholder network should be engaged in view of creating sector-based CSR 
benchmarks and sustainability priorities; 
• GRI should engage in further advocacy with governments, international institutions 
and CSR networks. 
 
 
 
The Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes 
 
Christina Hanley 
 
Launched in 1999, the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) is the world’s first 
tradable index series ranking publicly traded companies according to their sustainability 
performance. By evaluating companies against widely accepted best practice principles 
and benchmarks, DJSI encourages firms to improve their sustainability rating in order to 
join and stay on the lists. In addition to creating a competitive setting for sustainable 
corporate behavior, DJSI enables asset managers to consistently follow sustainability 
portfolios in the stock market, and fulfills consumer demand for socially responsible 
investing options. Borne in collaboration between the Dow Jones Indexes (DJI), 
Sustainable Asset Management (SAM) Group and STOXX Limited, the DJSI umbrella 
now encompasses over 24 different global, European and North American indexes. 
 
Dow Jones & Company (DJ&Co.) 
The Dow Jones Indexes is a subsidiary of Dow Jones & Company, an American global 
business news and information corporation famous for publishing The Wall Street 
Journal. Its index division is, “a leading full-service index provider that develops, 
maintains, and licenses indexes for use as benchmarks and as the basis of investment 
products.”93 Best known for its Dow Jones Industrial Average, the company provides 
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more than 130 thousand equity and fixed income indexes.  It also measures hedge fund 
and commodity markets. The DJI strives to maintain its indexes through unbiased, 
transparent and methodical practices.94 
 
STOXX Limited  
Founded in 1998 by the Deutsche Börse, SWX Swiss Exchange and DJ&Co., STOXX 
Limited, which creates and manages tradable market indexes, has become Europe’s 
premier index. More than 800 firms hold DJI or STOXX licenses, and STOXX’s 
collaboration with DJI facilitates inclusion of all major markets beyond Europe. 
Licencees use the indexes as underlyings for Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which are 
tradable baskets of stocks, bonds or futures.95 
 
SAM Group 
A Zürich-based independent firm specializing in sustainability asset management, SAM 
Group serves customers around the globe, including insurance companies, foundations, 
pension funds, banks and individuals. SAM conducts independent research, combining 
sustainability and future-oriented criteria in order to classify companies so money can 
be managed transparently, safely and with returns.96 SAM Group is responsible for 
analyzing, marketing and publishing the DJSI, as well as maximizing transparency and 
index accessibility. 
 
DJ&Co., STOXX and SAM fund the creation and maintenance of the DJSI. An expensive 
but profitable private sector initiative, DJSI now manages assets valued at USD 5.5 
billion.97 
 
Sustainability Indexes98 
The DJSI99 operates three main types of indexes under identical criteria. The overarching 
goal for each category is to “measure the stock market performance of the top 10 or 20 
percent [depending on index type] of the leading sustainability companies in all 
sectors… [and to] provide a liquid base for a variety of financial products.”100 DJSI 
members are chosen on the basis their economic, environmental and social performance. 
Appendix A provides a table of the index types and their subcomponents. 
 
 
Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI World) 
DJSI World Index, opened September 8, 1999, is the world’s leading sustainability-
oriented index. It assembles the leading 10 percent of the 2,500 companies listed on the 
Dow Jones Global Index (DJGI) into one composite and five subdivided series, which 
either include or exclude firms profiting from firearms and armaments, tobacco, alcohol 
or gambling.  
 
Dow Jones STOXX Sustainability Index (DJSI STOXX)  
 37
Launched October 15, 2001, DJSI STOXX lists the top 20 percent of sustainable firms 
from the Dow Jones STOXX SM 600 Index. DJSI STOXX is the core performance-tracking 
index in Europe. Its subcomponent, the Euro STOXX Sustainability Index (EURO 
STOXX), follows business performance within the Eurozone. DJSI STOXX index 
groupings include four narrower sub-indexes that exclude firms profiting from 
armaments and firearms, tobacco, alcohol, gambling and adult entertainment. Launched 
on January 31, 2006, Dow Jones STOXX Sustainability 40 Index (DJSI STOXX 40) and 
Dow Jones EURO STOXX Sustainability 40 Index (DJSI EURO STOXX 40) are blue chip 
indexes listing DJSI STOXX outstanding performers.   
 
Dow Jones Sustainability North America Index (DJSI North America)  
The newest of the indexes, DJSI North America, was launched September 23, 2005. The 
North American index is structured much like the European set, listing the most 
sustainable 20 percent of North America’s largest 600 DJGI firms. Subgroups include 
DJSI United States and indexes that exclude firms profiting from firearms and 
armaments, tobacco, alcohol and gambling. 
 
Customized Indexes 
The DJSI design enables investors to create individualized sustainability indexes by 
industry sector, region, currency and other dimensions. Examples include the DJ Islamic 
Market Sustainability and World Water Indexes. This report does not attempt to cover 
customable indexes as they are relatively uncommon and lie on the margins of DJSI’s 
core business.  
 
Methodology101 
Corporate Sustainability Assessment 
SAM defines corporate sustainability as, “a business approach to create long-term 
shareholder value by embracing opportunities and managing risks deriving from 
economic, environmental and social developments.”102 Many asset managers recognize 
sustainability as a cornerstone success factor and as a “catalyst for enlightened and 
disciplined management.”103 This has led to a recent profusion of investors seeking to 
diversify their portfolios through sustainable investing. In order to choose firms for each 
index, SAM applies its Corporate Sustainability Assessment (CSA) as outlined below. 
 
Index Creation 
The DJSI World and North America indexes stem from the DJGI, and DJSI STOXX from 
STOXX 600. Any firm listed on the sustainability index is fully integrated with its 
respective matriarch index. In order to become a member of DJSI, a company first 
undergoes general STOXX or DJGI procedures (depending on where it is listed) and 
CSA evaluation. Outcomes determine if and where the firm will be listed. For example, 
an American firm may perform well compared with its Mexican and Canadian 
competition and be listed on the DJSI North America, but its score may be too low to 
qualify for listing on DJSI World.  
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Evaluation Criteria 
In order to reflect prevailing best practice and auditing methods, the CSA heeds 
recommendations from private consultants and industry specialists in developing its 
principles. The assessment considers sustainability in three dimensions: economic, 
environmental and social. It evaluates impact according to general principles, which 
apply to all companies, as well to additional sector-specific principles.  
 
General principles account for 50 percent of the evaluation. They include widely 
accepted standards for: 
• Environmental management and performance; 
• Supply chain management; 
• Corporate governance; 
• Human rights;  
• Labour; and 
• Risk and crisis management. 
 
The remainder of the assessment score is based on sector-specific sustainability 
performance principles. Evaluation yields a numerical score for each company, which 
determines industry leaders by sector.  
 
Data Collection 
Information for quantitative measurement is obtained via questionnaires, 
documentation, media and stakeholder analysis, as well as company contact. If a firm 
fails to complete the questionnaire, SAM bases its analysis on the other criteria. 
 
Table 1:  
Information Sources:  
Questionnaire • Sector-specific 
• Signed by a senior-level employee 
• SAM analysts validate responses 
• Verified by Pricewater House Coopers (external source)  
Documentation • All public information; e.g. financial, sustainability, 
environmental, social, health and safety reports 
• Internal documentation and special reports 
Media & Stakeholder 
Analysis 
• Press releases, articles, employee and investor feedback  
Company Contact  • Discussions and phone conversations with company 
representatives  
 
Score Determination  
Following data collection, SAM applies a pre-determined weighting and scoring system 
in which each question carries an individual maximum score value and weight within 
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the CSA’s economic, environment or social assessment section.104 SAM's database thus 
quantifies corporate sustainability performance and assigns a numerical score to each 
firm. 
 
The evaluation methodology is applied identically to all firms on the DJGI and the 
STOXX 600. The only difference is the percentage of firms selected for each index; the 
CSA selects the leading 10 percent from the DJGI for listing on DJSI World, whereas the 
top 20 percent make the North America indexes. Similarly, the top 20 percent from the 
STOXX 600 are listed on STOXX sustainability indexes.  
 
Monitoring 
Daily Monitoring 
Once accepted onto the indexes, companies are subject to daily performance 
supervision. The Corporate Sustainability Monitoring Department is responsible for 
gauging whether a firm is partaking in economically, environmentally or socially risky 
behaviour that could be detrimental to its business objectives, values and reputation. 
Basing its monitoring on publicly available information, obtained through the media 
and via stakeholders, the department verifies that corporate behaviour meets the 
principles laid out in its policies. 
 
Issues Monitored Include105: 
• Conduct Codes; e.g. tax fraud, money laundering, antitrust, corruption,    bribery 
• Corporate Governance; e.g. balance sheet fraud, insider trading 
• Customer Relationship Management; e.g. product recall, customer complaints 
• Risk and Crisis Management; e.g. accidents, fatalities, workplace safety issues, 
technical failures 
• Supply Chain Management; e.g. major price fixing, unfair competition cases 
• Environmental Management; e.g. ecological disasters, hazardous substances, 
grossly mismanaged long-term pollution 
• External Stakeholders; e.g. cases indicative of company systematically exploiting 
weak governance in emerging countries 
• Labour Practice Indicators; e.g. cases involving discrimination, forced 
resettlements, child labour, workplace accidents, occupational health and safety 
 
This ongoing review process, conducted by Pricewater House Coopers, can lead to index 
exclusion. A firm that exhibits poor performance in one of the tracked issues may be 
dismissed even if its annual CSA scores were exceptional. In the event of a crisis, 
analysts evaluate the impact of the crisis on the firm’s core business and reputation. In 
large crises, analysts consider issue management quality according to the firm’s reaction, 
stakeholder communication, minimization of effects and steps taken for future 
prevention. If reputation management is deemed lacking relative to crisis severity, SAM 
will recommend that the firm be removed from the index. SAM Group notifies the 
corporation if exclusion is imminent.  
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Annual and Quarterly Reviews 
In order to ensure accurate inclusion of the top 10 or 20 percent of the most sustainable 
firms, DJSI conducts annual reviews in which SAM essentially repeats its CSA. This five-
month process concludes with an announcement of index additions or deletions. Since 
companies on the DJSI World, North America and STOXX indexes stem from larger 
sources, the base indexes are reviewed annually and quarterly. The specific quarterly 
review process is ambiguous, but its main purpose is to remain up-to-date as firms 
create spin-offs, merge, go bankrupt and issue initial public offerings throughout the 
year.   
 
Instrument Rationale  
DJSI provides a “bridge between companies implementing sustainability principles and 
investors wishing to profit from their superior performance and favorable risk/return 
profiles.”106 The overarching goal is to devise, develop and construct functional, accurate 
and tradable indexes, adding value to index operators, listed firms, investors and society 
at large.  
 
Index managers and DJSI operators benefit from diversifying and providing a niche 
market “sustainable” product. “Greenness” and sustainability are thought to be long-
term trends, and investors increasingly perceive such features as crucial components of 
a well-managed business.107 The DJSI caters to the trend of socially responsible investing 
(SRI), supplying clients with additional information on sustainability trends as a means 
to encourage further investment.  
 
As a business tool, DJSI financially quantifies risks, opportunities and costs reflected in a 
company’s sustainability strategy. Listed firms gain positive recognition from leading 
finance management companies and benefit from increased investment in their 
products. The competitive ranking of firms encourages them to set their own 
benchmarks and to act progressively towards the environmental, social and economic 
welfare of society.  
 
DJSI in the CSR Landscape  
DJSI differs from other CSR instruments inasmuch as it is a ranking rather than a 
guideline or rating tool. In contrast to most other CSR tools, it uses positive corporate 
behaviour to propel profit generation for investors and index operators alike. It drives 
change not by imposing specific principles on member companies, but by prompting 
firms to compete to improve their sustainability. Interaction with other CSR tools is 
therefore generally complementary: many DJSI members use other tools in this 
handbook, which help them develop the high standards that enable them to join the 
index.  
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One amongst hundreds of indexes available on the stock market, DJSI shares even the 
niche market for sustainability and CSR indexes with several comparable products. 
Typically these correspond to either their associated stock exchange or to specific sub-
niche markets. DJSI’s main competitor is the FTSE4Good series. Sponsored by FTSE, 
FTSE4Good selects corporations based on their environmental sustainability, human 
rights records and stakeholder relations. FTSE, like Dow Jones, is one of the world’s 
largest index providers and lists a number of the largest MNEs.  
 
Whereas the FTSE and DJSI are global in scope, the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
Socially Responsible Investing (JSE-SRI) Index focuses on firms in emerging economies. 
The JSE-SRI Index adheres to the “triple bottom line” concept, evaluating business 
practices according to their environmental, social and economic sustainability. 
Companies from the index voluntarily submit information about their business practices 
and the JSE ranks their impact.   
 
Indexes focused on CSR sub-niche markets include the SIX/GES Ethical Index, which 
leads analysis in Northern Europe, and the MAALA SRI Index, which focuses on CSR 
activities of organisations listed on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The German Natur-
Aktien-Index, by contrast, compares renewable energy companies across several 
international stock indexes.  
 
Broadly speaking, DJSI has established its position within the SRI Index market by 
specifically targeting the sustainability of prominent multinationals from its own large 
index listing. Coordination between DJSI and other sustainability indexes is however 
lacking. As a result, standards vary by index. This hinders investors’ and firms’ ability to 
make informed sustainability investment choices.  
 
Geographical Spread 
Since anyone can buy or sell index shares, the geographical spread of DJSI’s ownership 
is global. Asset managers located in 15 countries hold 47 DJSI licenses.108 Europe and 
North America hold the majority of these licenses, followed by Japan. Given that 
sustainability is primarily a western-driven initiative, the majority of shareholders are 
from developed countries. This may change as emerging economies become more 
involved in SRI. 
 
Figure 1 shows the spread of DJSI World firms by country. Almost 50 percent of listed 
firms come from the US and UK, followed by Germany and Switzerland. Eighteen 
percent of firms on the DJSI World are headquartered in non-western countries (Japan 
and Others).  
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Figure 1:109 
 
 
Sectoral Spread 
The DJSI uses a global standard – the Industry Classification Benchmark – to categorize 
index participants. Introduced by the Dow Jones and the FTSE,110 the Industry 
Classification Benchmark arranges the macroeconomy into 10 industry groupings and 
the 18 super-sectors responsible for generating the majority of world revenue flows. The 
DJSI uses the 18 super-sectors to create 57 sector groups, which it applies to all of its 
indexes. Figure 2 indicates the distribution of firms listed on the DJSI World Index by 
sector.  
 
Figure 2:111 
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Academic Discussion 
Predominantly positive in its disposition towards DJSI, academic literature commonly 
relates DJSI’s credibility to its being a Dow Jones subcomponent and its association with 
SAM.112 A 2004 study by SustainAbility and Mistra, for example, ranks SAM as the 
“world wide leading sustainability research organisation [which] explicitly link[s] 
sustainability strengths, weaknesses and risks to investment value drivers.”113 The study 
applauds DJSI’s ability to connect investment value drivers such as revenues, 
shareholder value, compliance costs, customer attraction, brand value and reputation, 
efficiency, innovation, risk profile and regulatory liability.114  
 
In a comparative analysis of implementation processes of SRI-oriented organisations, 
SAM won best practice for research methodology, management and research and 
information source quality.115 In the application of its scheme to DJSI, SAM stands out 
for its strong sector-specific indicators, mature review process, transparency and third 
party validation.116 It is also lauded for including external verification in the weighting 
of assessment questionnaires and stakeholders in information gathering, both of which 
make SAM stand out among the competition.  
 
A 2006 study by Schäfer et al. argues that DJSI’s assessment process encourages 
companies to continually improve their sustainability.117 Indeed, trends show that 
companies are typically removed from the indexes not because they scored worse, but 
because they have not progressed quickly enough.118 SAM, unlike other indexes, 
provides detailed reports (at a cost) for companies seeking in-depth analysis of their 
sustainability management compared to their competition. Regular contact and feedback 
with index members enables firms to make positive changes.  
 
Despite all its praise, however, the research also identifies four prominent problems 
with DJSI and like indexes. First, an industry-wide weakness afflicting SAM is that its 
research and the DJSI membership are too heavily concentrated on large companies 
based in Europe and North America. Second, although SAM has a high proportion of 
employees with financial backgrounds, researchers typically are not specialists in 
financial concepts and techniques.119 Third, “questionnaire fatigue” can be detrimental to 
the review process. This could be circumvented by the use of internal peer review to 
assess research process compliance.120  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, companies removed from an index want to 
know why, but evaluation is not structured in such a way that it corresponds to precise 
criteria. Instead, performance evaluation is relative to competition and the sum of 
several criteria. While this has important implications for the competitive dynamic 
behind the DJSI, it makes it difficult to pinpoint specific reasons why one firm made the 
list and another did not.121   
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Policy Discussion and Evaluation 
Research indicates that as competition increases, asset managers’ and investors’ 
willingness to pay for research services decreases.122 Research-based organisations such 
as SAM must therefore constantly strive to find innovative ways of maintaining their 
viability and keeping sustainable investing in the mainstream. However, critics debate 
whether and to what extent ethical investing should be encouraged at all, as its ability to 
drive change remains uncertain.123  
 
Agreement is also yet to be reached on the comparative advantages of best practice versus 
exclusion strategies in SRI. The DJSI “best practice” policy regards certain processes and 
methods as being more sustainable than others. The FTSE4Good, by contrast, simply 
excludes certain sectors it deems inherently unsustainable or unethical. Accordingly, it 
excludes the ‘sin sector’ – firms profiting from tobacco, arms and nuclear power.124 The 
DJSI flexible model allows a greater degree of investor choice by providing a composite 
index that includes the ‘sin sector’ and subcomponents excluding one or all sectors.  
 
There are many inherent difficulties in weighing a company’s sustainability. For 
example, should positive actions counteract negative behaviour? A company that scores 
badly on a few components and excessively high in others may be listed on the DJSI, 
despite the fact that it may not truly be a “sustainable” company. While it is frequently 
argued that DJSI’s weighting system needs to evolve with new best-practice standards, a 
thorough analysis of the correctness of the scoring system has yet to emerge.  
 
Still a relatively new tool, consensus has yet to be reached on whether SRI Indexes 
measure improvements in company behaviour or rather improvements in marketing. 
On this count, DJSI is regarded as proving its legitimacy each year when it adds and 
excludes firms according to their performance. In 2007, for example, there were 47 
additions and 37 removals.125 DJSI is positively received outside of the business realm 
because it will not list a firm just because it is the best of the unsustainable competition.  
 
Recommendations 
DJSI stands out among the competition, both as an important CSR tool and a pioneer in 
the SRI industry. The combination of SAM’s specialty niche research and Dow Jones’ 
extensive corporate reach makes DJSI reputable around the world. Furthermore, its 
transparent processes make it more reliable than some of its competing indexes. 
 
DJSI also seems effective at influencing corporate behavior. When firms are removed 
from DJSI lists, it is typically not because they are becoming less sustainable but rather 
because they have not advanced as quickly as their competition.126 Removal encourages 
firms to take steps to rejoin the list. DJSI is effective because its competitive design 
builds upon free-market concepts with which companies are familiar.  
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However, SRI remains a new field about which little is known. In order to assess DJSI 
more fully, further research into SRI instruments’ effectiveness as catalysts of corporate 
change is necessary. The following questions should serve as a starting point for future 
research on SRI in general and DJSI in particular. 
• What is the long-term viability of SRI? What are the current trends? 
• To what degree do these indexes motivate socially responsible behaviour? Do certain 
indexes lead to more corporate change than others? Which ones are the most 
competitive? Where has change been the greatest? 
• How is the methodology and implementation of DJSI evolving? 
• What specific best practice methods should be applied across all SRI indexes? 
• What is the relationship between DJSI membership and the use of other CSR tools?  
 
Improve DJSI Research and Evaluation Process 
It is difficult to identify particular reasons why a given firm is added or subtracted from 
the DJSI. While SAM’s research methodology is strengthened by the fact that it examines 
the entire business process, it remains difficult for companies to identify which specific 
changes they should make to regain membership. Increasing assessment process 
transparency would be beneficial.  
 
SAM’s research has been criticized for employing a high proportion of analysts with 
little financial experience and for varying employee workloads. To guarantee 
dependability, greater emphasis should be made on hiring employees with stronger 
finance and sector-specific backgrounds. SAM should also ensure an even distribution of 
the number of companies assessed by each analyst.  
 
Expand the Scope  
In order to increase its impact, DJSI should expand the scope of the companies it 
evaluates. Companies currently listed are overwhelmingly MNCs. Although this fits 
with the nature of an instrument that focuses on publicly traded firms, DJSI should seize 
opportunities to develop indexes featuring smaller publicly traded companies. In 
addition, the government and/or NGO sector should collaborate with DJSI to create a 
non-tradable index of smaller, privately managed firms. Additionally, DJSI should 
consider developing an emerging economy index in order to expand its reach outside of 
Europe and North America. 
 
Awareness of Market Changes  
In order for DJSI to remain a market leader, it needs to keep evolving and expanding its 
information gathering and analysis process as new best practice methods emerge. 
Further transparency could help avoid conflict of interest between profit generation and 
improving corporate behaviour. Finally, coordination among member firms and all SRI 
indexes should be improved. In a world market populated by hundreds of different 
standards, there are many opportunities for DJSI to collaborate with other financial 
index services. The market for sustainability indexes would benefit greatly from the 
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development of a set of general, base sustainability criteria that could be standardized 
and applied to all SRI indexes.  
 
 
Equator Principles   
 
Janine Jacob 
 
Financial institutions are less exposed to risks associated with CSR than other types of 
firms. The simple explanation for this is that they do not produce their products in 
developing countries, and are therefore shielded from problems such as inappropriate 
health and safety standards for their workers, child labour, inappropriate working 
hours, etc. However, financial institutions do play roles as large lenders and project 
financiers in the developing world. In order to understand how this sometimes 
translates into CSR problems, we should begin by defining the term “project finance”:  
 
“a method of funding in which the lender looks primarily to the revenues 
generated by a single project, both as the source of repayment and as 
security for the exposure. This type of financial is usually for large, complex 
and expensive installations that might include, for example, power plants, 
chemical processing plants, mines, transportation infrastructure, 
environment, and telecommunications infrastructure. Project finance may 
take the form of financing of the construction of a new capital installation, or 
refinancing of an existing installation, with or without improvements. In 
such transactions, the lender is usually paid solely or almost exclusively out 
of the money generated by the contracts for the facility’s output, such as the 
electricity sold by a power plant. The borrower is usually an SPE (Special 
Purpose Entity) that is not permitted to perform any function other than 
developing, owning, and operating the installation. The consequence is that 
repayment depends primarily on the project’s cash flow and on the collateral 
value of the project’s assets.”127  
 
A variety of risks can arise from such projects. For example, the construction of a large 
airport can erode valuable natural environments, and the noise levels may cause health 
problems for people living nearby. The construction of a pipeline in a developing 
country can destroy natural habitats, alter living conditions for indigenous peoples and 
threaten their very existence. Examples like these are common.  
 
Although financial institutions are not the direct sources of such high-risk projects, they 
often provide the financial means necessary to make large projects possible. The Equator 
Principles were developed as a means to prevent such social and environmental 
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problems and to protect financial institutions from the risks they entail. The following 
report outlines the nature of the Principles and their implementation, and discusses 
possible problems and shortcomings of the instrument.  
 
Background 
The Equator Principles (EP) are a set of environmental and social benchmarks for 
managing environmental and social issues in development project finance. They 
establish a common standard between adopting institutions, and provide guidelines by 
which financial institutions can assess and address risks associated with project 
financing.  
 
One of the main driving forces behind the development of the EP is the German bank 
WestLB. WestLB was motivated to develop the initiative by its experiences in financing 
a pipeline project in Ecuador. The project had a deep negative impact on Ecuador’s 
population, both socially and environmentally, and the issue was taken up by various 
NGOs. Heavy criticism, intensive debates and discussions in the media ensued. 
Eventually, in an attempt to curtail further damage to its reputation, WestLB initiated 
measures to help prevent similar problems in the future.  
 
The EP, led by WestLB, Citigroup, ABN AMRO, and Barclays, was launched on June 4, 
2003, in Washington, D.C.128 Although initiated and primarily driven by private financial 
institutions, the development and drafting of the Principles was undertaken in 
conjunction with NGOs, project sponsors, and the World Bank Group’s International 
Finance Corporation (IFC).  
 
The EP consists of a set of ten principles. Financial institutions that adopt the EP, known 
as Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs), agree to provide loans above a 
certain amount only to project financing that fulfill the Principles. Initially, the Principles 
applied only to project financing over USD 50 million. This was reduced to USD 10 
million at the EP’s last revision. EPFIs are committed to constantly reviewing the 
Principles, and to alter them when necessary. The latest revision of the EP occurred in 
July 2006. As of April of 2008, 60 financial institutions had adopted the EP.129 
 
Monitoring and Compliance  
The EP is a self-regulatory tool. Adoption of the Principles is voluntary, and no 
supervisory authority monitors company compliance or correct implementation. The 
adopting institution “individually declares that it has or will put in place internal 
policies and processes that are consistent with the Equator Principles.” Any financial 
costs incurred through the implementation of the Principles are borne by the financial 
institution itself. EPFIs benefit from assistance and training provided by the IFC. 
 
The adoption procedure requires the institution to first fill out an adoption form, to 
inform the press about its adoption of the EP, and to establish a link to the EP on its 
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website. More importantly, the revised Principles of 2006 now include a tenth principle 
that requires EPFIs to report publicly about their EP implementation experiences at least 
once a year. In addition to describing implementation processes, reports must indicate 
the number of transactions screened by the institution and the categorization of the 
projects/transactions according to the Principles.  
 
Furthermore, projects classified as Category A (“projects with potential significant 
adverse social or environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible or 
unprecedented”) and Category B (“projects with potential limited adverse social or 
environmental impacts that are few in number, generally site-specific, largely reversible 
and readily addressed though mitigation measures”) must be reviewed for EP 
compliance by an independent social or environmental expert. The expert must continue 
to verify monitoring information over the lifespan of the loan provided.  
 
Rationale  
Financial institutions are motivated to adopt the EP in order to improve their risk 
management. Although the risks facing financial institutions vary from company to 
company, some risks are prominent for all. These include credit risks, market price risks, 
operational risks, liquidity risks, and reputation risks. Risk management has become an 
integral part of firms’ operational structures, and continues to grow in importance.  
 
The risks banks face when investing in projects and when providing loans are primarily 
credit and reputation risks. First, provision of loans always involves a risk of default by 
borrowers. If a project does not generate expected cash flows, or results in default, the 
bank loses its investment. Second, as stated in the introduction, various environmental 
and social risks are associated with project financing, particularly in the developing 
world. If the bank provides loans to a project that causes environmental or social 
damage, it can incur heavy costs to its reputation. This can have serious negative impact 
on the company’s overall business operations.  
 
When properly incorporated into their risk management systems, the Equator Principles 
can help banks assess and mitigate credit and reputation risks associated with project 
financing. Since this entails significant benefits for banks involved in project financing, 
the EP has the propensity to alter firms’ behaviour.  
 
Implementation  
The EP apply to financial institutions’ investments in all industry sectors globally, for all 
project financing with total project capital costs of USD 10 million or more.  
 
While projects may be undertaken in emerging markets or OECD countries, the EP 
includes a section dealing explicitly with projects in countries not classified as ‘high-
income’ according to World Bank Development Indicators. In such cases, the EP requires 
firms to use IFC Performance Standards and the industry-specific World Bank Group 
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Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines) to assess projects’ 
associated risks.  
 
In high-income OECD countries, domestic regulatory requirements and laws exceed the 
requirements as set forth in the IFC’s Performance Standards and EHS Guidelines. 
Hence, for EPFIs financing projects in such countries it is sufficient to complete an 
assessment process demonstrating compliance with local and national laws, regulations 
and permits in regards to social and environmental matters. EPFIs nevertheless 
categorize and review the projects according to all Principles.  
 
Scope 
The EP’s scope is limited to project financing only. As of 2008, 60 banks from all over the 
world had adopted the EP. EPFIs include Financial B.C. in Togo, Banco do Brasil in 
Brasil, and a deal has also been signed with the IFC in Beijing to introduce the EP in 
China. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of EPFIs are based in North America 
and Western Europe.  
 
Studies on Implementation  
Academic literature on the EP is small. The few studies that do deal with the EP focus on 
its implementation. These studies mostly compare the performance and conduct of 
EPFIs to non-EPFIs.  
 
A 2007 study by Scholtens and Dam indicates that the social, environmental and ethical 
policies adopted by EPFIs are significantly broader and different from those of their 
non-EPFI counterparts. It also finds that companies’ shareholders generally do not resist 
EP implementation. Finally, the study shows that there are no characteristic differences 
between EPFIs and other financial institutions besides the scope of their social, 
environmental and ethical policies. The authors thus conclude that financial institutions 
primarily use the EP as a device to signal their good conduct and responsible behaviour. 
 
These findings are corroborated in a 2006 study by Wright and Rwabizambuga.130 The 
study argues that the Equator Principles, like other voluntary codes of conduct and 
principles, are generally used by companies’ as a means to strengthen their reputation. 
The authors back this assumption by highlighting the geographical concentration of 
most EPFIs in Western Europe and Northern America where, they argue, incentive for 
reputation improvement is highest. 
 
Problems and Shortcomings 
Academic research and civil society groups indicate various problems with the EP. 
Probably the most important criticism concerns the EP’s lack of formal monitoring and 
screening mechanisms. This makes it impossible to ensure that EPFIs actually comply 
with the Principles and adhere to their own set standards and internal policies.131 As it 
stands, EP monitoring is done almost exclusively by NGOs. While monitoring of this 
 50
sort can be effective, NGOs’ means for addressing breaches of the EP are limited to 
dialogue with companies themselves or, in the case of severe misdemeanor, going public 
with the case. Furthermore, NGOs cannot be expected to verify correct implementation, 
compliance and commitment to the rules with the same degree of consistency as a 
formal institution set up for this purpose. Short of a mechanism for sanctioning EPFIs 
that violate the Principles, the EP is prone to adverse selection and free-riding – 
institutions may reap the benefits of EP membership regardless of their actual 
behaviour.  
 
A related problem concerns the lack of enforceability of the EP. This shortcoming is 
underscored by evidence that environmental and social issues can and do still arise in 
relation to EPFI-financed projects. In 2004, for example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline was financed by eight EP banks and the IFC, despite an NGO assessment 
alleging 127 breaches of the Principles.  
 
This example raises a final concern, which is the fact that the Principles allow for large 
differences in the ways EPFIs classify projects. This results in substantial implementation 
gaps and incoherence in EP implementation. 
 
Policy Discussion and Evaluation  
Despite revisions made in 2006, the EP is commonly criticized for shortcomings in 
transparency, accountability, and governance mechanisms necessary to close persistent 
implementation gaps between EPFIs. This deficiency is highlighted by cases of EPFI-
financed projects violating social and environmental standards.132 
 
Stakeholders have also expressed concern that the new IFC Performance Standards – the 
basis for assessing project financing in the developing world – represent a weakening of 
the Principles. They worry that this may have negative consequences for the overall EP 
initiative. EPFIs, however, reject this notion. They argue that the revised Principles entail 
much stronger requirements for both EPFIs and borrowers.133 
 
Another dimension of the EP policy discussion concerns possible means to improve the 
instrument’s compliance monitoring. As it stands, the closest thing to an independent 
EP compliance monitoring institution is BankTrack, a civil society network that channels 
responses to the Principles and ensures that EPFIs remain accountable for their actions. 
BankTrack members include NGOs such as Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Rainforest 
Action Network (RAN). BankTrack members and EPFIs meet twice a year to discuss 
shortcomings and means to improve the EP. While governments and NGOs favor a 
stronger monitoring device, financial institutions oppose this idea. EPFIs argue that 
stronger monitoring would increase their bureaucratic burden, and drain valuable time 
and resources.  
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Finally, the EP is accused of incorrectly addressing the rights of indigenous people.134 
This is a controversial issue. On one side of the debate, EPFIs argue that projects are 
assessed on the basis of potential social and environmental impacts, which encompasses 
the rights of indigenous people. Unsatisfied with this argument, critics maintain that 
assessments of potential impact on general populations cannot be assumed to 
appropriately address indigenous peoples’ rights, which are oftentimes insufficiently 
protected by local laws and regulations. 
 
The EP in the CSR Landscape 
The EP shares space with a number of comparable instruments targeting environmental 
and social impact in the finance sector.  
 
One such initiative is the non-profit Carbon Disclosure Project, the aim of which is to 
facilitate dialogue between shareholders and corporations regarding the future impacts 
they are likely to suffer from climate change. “Supported by quality information,” the 
Carbon Disclosure Project believes that “a rational response to climate change will 
emerge.”135 Another environmental initiative, the Forge Group, develops and issues 
guidelines on environmental management and reporting for the financial sector in Great 
Britain. Unlike the EP, the Forge Group considers how banks can alter their corporate 
behaviour as such – i.e. corporate functions and operations – in order to capitalize on 
business opportunities generated by climate change and avert environmental risks.136 
 
In addition to these initiatives, a number of financial institutions have initiated their own 
projects targeting social and environmental issues. One such project, developed by 
HSBC, is the “Global Climate Change Benchmark Index,” which follows the stock 
market performance of companies set to benefit from addressing climate change. HSBC 
has also formed a Climate Partnership with a number of institutions, such as the Climate 
Group, Earthwatch Institute, Smithsonian Tropical Institute and the WorldWide Fund. 
On a smaller scale, it is not uncommon for banks committed to environmentally friendly 
behaviour to alter their in-house business operations in view of minimizing their 
environmental impact.  
 
In terms of ethical and social behaviour, a number of initiatives have been launched in 
the financial sector to combat terrorist financing, money laundering and corruption. The 
most prominent of these initiatives is the Wolfsberg Principles. Developed by the 
Wolfsberg Group – which consists of 12 members, including Transparency International 
and a number of leading private banks (e.g. Deutsche Bank, UBS AG, Societe Generale, 
J.P.Morgan Chase, HSBC, etc.) – the Wolfsberg Principles establish benchmarks and 
guidelines to help the financial sector fight corruption, money laundering and terrorist 
financing.137  
 
A number of banks have also taken it upon themselves to act ethically by refusing to 
invest in companies “which extract or expel fossil fuels; or in companies which use 
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animals to test cosmetics or are involved in certain genetic modification.”138 While 
motivated by similar reasoning to the EP, such initiatives by individual firms are 
inherently more limited in scope than the global principles represented by the EP. In 
addition, they tend to focus either on environmental or social dimensions of financial 
sector activity, but not both at once. 
 
The World Bank Group Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines) 
are similar to the EP in that they are geared toward large-scale international project 
financing. As noted under ‘Implementation’ above, the EP uses the EHS Guidelines to 
assess risks associated with projects financed in non-OECD countries. The EHS 
Guidelines consist of “technical reference documents with general and industry-specific 
examples of Good International Industry Practice (GIIP).” Updated on a regular basis, 
“the EHS Guidelines contain the performance levels and measures that are normally 
acceptable to IFC and are generally considered to be achievable in new facilities at 
reasonable costs by existing technology.” For IFC-financed projects, this may involve the 
establishment of site-specific targets with an appropriate timetable for achieving them.139  
 
Although a subsidiary of the World Bank, the IFC uses its own set of environmental and 
social performance standards. This is because World Bank procedures are usually 
geared towards its public sector partners, while the IFC supports private investments in 
the developing world. Given that private partners cannot fulfill the same requirements 
as public partners (e.g. changes in the law) the ten World Bank EHS Guidelines were 
modeled into eight IFC Performance Standards.140  Designed to achieve the same broad 
environmental, health and safety objectives, the sector-specific standards are binding for 
all IFC projects.  
 
A final instrument sharing similarities with the EP is the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), a framework for non-financial reporting. In fact, it has been suggested that the 
GRI could help bolster EPFI compliance if used in conjunction with the EP. However, 
the EP already requires reporting and, given that the GRI is accused of insufficiently 
scrutinizing reports, it is unlikely that the EP would benefit substantially from 
cooperation with the GRI. 
 
Recommendations 
One of the main strengths of the EP is the fact that they are tailored to the financial 
services sector. It is also noteworthy that the threshold for EP applicability, at USD 10 
million, is low enough to cover a large number of potential projects. Also, recent growth 
trends in EP membership seem set to continue. Newcomers from emerging markets such 
as Brazil and China represent a promising addition to EP membership and a 
development that should be fostered.  
 
However, the real implications of the EP on various stakeholders, including banks 
themselves, their clients, consumers, etc. remain difficult to assess. This situation is 
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worsened by the pervasive lack of transparency and accountability with regards to EP 
implementation and compliance. In order to make the EP more effective, changes should 
address shortcomings highlighted by academics and NGOs; namely, the lack of 
accountability, transparency, and compliance.  
 
While the Principles should remain voluntary, monitoring mechanisms for EPFIs should 
be improved. The lack of an institution mandated to follow EPFIs’ adherence to the 
Principles has precipitated free-riding: companies frequently reap reputational benefits 
from EP membership without substantially altering their behaviour. It is therefore 
recommended that an institution be established to track EPFIs’ adherence to the 
Principles and to apply mild sanctions in the case of non-compliance. Sanctions could 
entail issuance of warnings to non adhering firms, and mandatory training and 
workshops for financial institutions struggling with compliance. If violations continue, 
financial institutions should be removed from the list of EP compliant institutions. 
Sanctioning mechanisms should be designed so as not deter banks from adopting the 
Principles in the first place; rather, they should ensure that firms are following their EP 
obligations by making the implementation process and ongoing compliance more 
transparent to the public.  
 
Beyond reporting on their experiences with the EP, banks should be required to include 
in their annual reports substantial detail about how they followed the guidelines, how 
many projects they sponsored, how these projects were categorized, the criteria and 
mechanisms they used to assess the projects, and whether this has made a difference 
with the client. This would be complimented by the establishment of common and 
detailed standards for EP project classification to ensure that all banks use the same 
mechanisms of project classification, consistently and comparably.  
 
Finally, current efforts to bring emerging market banks on board the EP should be 
sustained and strengthened. Advertisement of the Principles in emerging economies – 
particularly the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) – is of uttermost 
importance. Rapid growth in these countries, coupled with their impressive financial 
means, can be expected to spurn substantial growth in their project financing activities. 
Financial sector compliance with environmental and social standards in these countries 
is crucial for the success of the overall CSR agenda.  
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Sustainable Public Procurement  
 
Jan Landmann 
 
Sustainable public procurement (SPP) involves regulation integrating social, 
environmental and economic sustainability criteria in public procurement decisions. The 
specific type of SPP discussed in this paper does not prescribe sustainable public 
procurement, but legally enables and encourages public agencies to do SPP. This allows 
flexibility concerning specific criteria and the scope of public procurement requirements.  
 
Background 
Public procurement has often been used to achieve preferred social outcomes in the 
United States and in Europe.141 The idea of SPP gained momentum when it was taken up 
in the international sphere. In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) encouraged governments to promote public procurement policies that support 
the development and diffusion of environmentally sustainable goods and services.  
 
EU Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC currently form the legal framework for 
national public procurement law in the European Union. How they are integrated into 
national law is left up to national policymakers, but the directives open up possibilities 
for member states to regard environmental and social criteria in addition to the 
traditional value-for-money principle. Depending on the national legal framework, SPP 
regulations can be installed and implemented by executive governments themselves or 
by the responsible legislative chambers.  
 
Rationale 
SPP legislation may be applied for the following reasons:  
• To avoid negative environmental and social impacts of governmental consumption, 
production and service delivery;  
• To set an example for the private sector by demonstrating that government takes 
sustainable development seriously;  
• To stimulate the private sector to innovate and to produce more cost effective and 
sustainable products;  
• To drive the business case of CSR by imposing pressure on the economic 
performance of suppliers and contractors.  
 
SPP is often expected to be more cost-intensive, entailing an extra burden on state 
budgets. Contradicting this assumption, however, evidence suggests that SPP could 
eventually be cost-saving, as it may lead to decreased energy and resource consumption 
or increased innovation and supplier performance.142 Although the net financial effects 
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remain unclear, there are reasons to believe that SPP requires greater public expenditure 
in the short run, with decreases yielded over time.  
 
SPP legislation is applied and implemented by national governments, and primarily 
targets public agencies. But it has strong implications for private suppliers and 
contractors as well. Attaching procurement decisions to sustainability criteria creates 
financial incentives for companies to adopt socially responsible practices, and to develop 
more sustainable products and procedures. As such, SPP law strengthens the business 
case of CSR; but it does so selectively, as it does not directly affect companies other than 
suppliers and contractors. SPP thus entails two roles or the government: “participating 
in the market as purchaser and at the same time regulating it through the use of its 
purchasing power to advance conceptions of social justice.”143  
 
Finally, SPP is a core interest of civil society organisations and associations because it 
provides impetus for corporate compliance to sustainability issues (e.g. trade unions 
advocate for tariff wages, or environmental protection agencies for environmental 
criteria).  
 
Implementation  
A large proportion of SPP policies are adopted in the form of legal instruments. In EU 
member states legislation accounts for about 35 percent of all SPP instruments, next to 
informational and so-called hybrid instruments.144 Nineteen EU countries have 
transferred the EU Directives into national legislation. The dissemination and quality of 
these national procurement laws is however far from uniform.  
 
In federal systems composed of self-governing entities, the scope of national SPP law 
may be more limited than in centralized systems. Furthermore, the extent to which 
public procurers actually incorporate sustainability criteria in their decisions depends on 
the clarity of the respective law and the guidance provided. Finally, the structures by 
which private supplies reach the public sector, which also differ from country to 
country, determine the dissemination of SPP’s effects throughout the business sector.  
 
Broadly speaking, take-up of SPP policies depends on country- and region-specific 
frameworks. Given these varying perceptions and constraints, it is no surprise that a 
2005 study assigned by the European Commission revealed considerable variation in the 
level of development of Green Public Procurement (GPP, a subset of SPP) policies 
among EU member states. This variance is explained by the indeterminate way in which 
SPP is presented in the EU Directives. By simply encouraging public procurers to take 
environmental and social criteria into account, the EU Directives have led to 
arbitrariness in SPP policy application, highly decentralized, unclear and complex 
procurement practices, as well as substantial legal uncertainty and conflicting 
sustainability criteria.145  
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Additional sources of resistance to SPP implementation are more pragmatic in nature. 
First, procurement personnel may face difficulties handling new SPP responsibilities. 
Fearing legal consequences in case of wrongdoing, they may be reluctant to use the new 
instruments. Second, monitoring compliance to additional criteria is expensive, difficult 
and bureaucratic.  
 
Academic Research 
An OECD study on GPP draws two important conclusions about the viability of SPP: 
first, there are a number of economic justifications for GPP; and second, there are no 
significant constraints barring the inclusion of environmental criteria in the procurement 
process.146 It also finds a scarcity of SPP practice in OECD countries. So what determines 
the take-up of SPP in public organisations? 
 
In 2007, Christopher McCrudden found that procurement law can enable CSR (as with 
SPP), facilitate CSR, or prevent CSR (which is the case with traditional procurement 
law). He concludes that public procurement requirements that go beyond general legal 
minimum standards (thereby fostering voluntary action) depend on the scope of social 
and environmental legislation – not just its existence. McCrudden’s argument 
corroborates the findings of a multi-stakeholder task force that prepared the UK 
Government Action Plan on SPP.147 In its international benchmarking of SPP activities, 
the task force found that the existence of SPP laws was not generally linked to countries’ 
SPP performance.  
 
General consensus has it that SPP legislation is not enough. In their analysis of national 
sustainable procurement policies in the EU, Steurer et al. argue that:148   
• Legal SPP instruments must be complemented by other policies; 
• SPP should reflect all three dimensions of sustainability (environmental, social and 
economic);  
• SPP should proactively use the value-for-money-principle.  
 
Elaborating these findings, Brammer and Walker identify four factors conducive to the 
effectiveness of SPP policy: implementation knowledge, financial expectations, 
organisational attitude/incentives and sufficient supply.149  
 
Policy Discussion and Evaluation  
SPP’s potential effectiveness as a means to strengthen CSR is disputed. First of all, SPP 
law seems to contradict the widely held position that CSR should be voluntary. 
Although SPP imposes no direct legal requirement on companies, it exerts substantial 
pressure on firms whose survival depends on public contracts. SPP may also distort 
competition. By extending public procurement criteria beyond quality and cost, SPP 
effectively decreases the number of potential suppliers. SPP is therefore likely to increase 
the cost of public purchasing. This can lead to higher taxes and/or fewer public services 
if eventual savings through SPP do not exceed initial costs. Critics thus argue that the 
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negative effects of SPP law – making procurement more costly, bureaucratic and less 
transparent – outweigh its positive effects. 
 
A recent ruling of the European Court of Justice outlawing non-comprehensive wage 
conditions in public tender contracts demonstrated the complicated relationship 
between SPP policies and the ideals of a free and competitive internal market.150 The SPP 
debate is split along similar lines: while neo-liberal policymakers and business 
associations typically reject any additional regulations affecting companies, SPP enjoys 
the support of advocacy groups that believe in government’s ability to steer society 
towards a common good. The latter include political parties, as well as NGOs and trade 
unions.  
 
Nevertheless, firms’ reactions are diverse. Many support SPP legislation and even 
contribute sustainable supply proposals. This is especially the case amongst SMEs 
struggling against high (foreign) price competition and for whom public contracting 
represents a major share of their earnings. Since legal minimum standards differ 
between countries, companies from highly regulated countries are more likely to 
demand high procurement standards, which can dull the competitive edge of companies 
from less regulated countries. However, many companies oppose the extra requirements 
and bureaucracy that additional criteria entail. This is especially the case amongst 
enterprises that have enjoyed a competitive edge under traditional procurement 
practice.  
 
SPP legislation is not sufficient to achieve SPP objectives. Successful SPP implementation 
requires that complementary measures be taken, especially in the fields of public and 
private capacity-building and awareness-raising. In order to reduce SPP’s complexity 
and increase its acceptance by stakeholders, SPP law should be linked to other CSR 
instruments. International CSR standards could, for example, be adopted as 
sustainability criteria. As a performance-oriented instrument, SPP could be a positive 
addition to value- and stakeholder-oriented instruments. As noted above, SPP provides 
a way for governments to lead by example. Besides encouraging companies to change 
their behavior in order to obtain lucrative public contracts, it has the potential to 
motivate other public procurers to follow suit. If this leads to new widely accepted 
sustainability standards or these companies turn out to perform better than others, 
enterprises not directly affected by public contracts may also be prompted to change 
their behavior. SPP therefore has the potential to encourage self-regulation in the wider 
private sector.  
 
In addition to not being sufficient, some studies show that SPP law is not even always 
necessary to achieve an internationally comparable good performance in SPP.151 Other 
SPP instruments – for example, informational or hybrid instruments – in certain 
circumstances may be equally or more effective and provide a potential substitute for 
legislation. In the context of largely legalistic administrative setups or primarily 
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performance-motivated CSR, concrete regulations may be preferable; if, on the other 
hand, CSR is especially value- or stakeholder-oriented, SPP law is likely not the most 
efficient way of increasing corporate responsibility. Effective SPP design must consider 
stakeholders’ ownership-structure, corporate governance and managerial organisation. 
SMEs or owner-led companies, for example, are more likely to adopt socially 
responsible behaviour out of concern for certain values or community involvement. 
Managers of publicly traded companies with heterogeneous shareholder structures, by 
contrast, are more likely to be persuaded by the “business case” for CSR.  
 
Recommendations  
SPP is a potentially powerful instrument in the CSR toolbox. With public expenditures 
accounting for 35-65 percent of GDP in developed countries, properly implemented SPP 
policies carry the promise of profound societal effects.152 Sustainability criteria in public 
contracts provide strong financial incentives for firms to meet set standards of socially 
desirable corporate behaviour. They also help governments achieve economic and social 
objectives for their taxpayers. However, SPP law also has potential negative side-effects, 
imposing an additional bureaucratic layer on businesses and public procurers, and 
making procurement decisions more complex and difficult.  
 
As indicated in this paper, the following characteristics are decisive for the effectiveness 
of SPP law:  
• Social and environmental regulatory framework;  
• Amount of public expenditure affected;  
• Administrative culture/ political priority;  
• Business structure (SMEs, MNEs, stock-market corporations);  
• Previous corporate behaviour;  
• Complementary SPP instruments;  
• Clarity of SPP legislation and proposed criteria.  
 
Thorough analysis of the effects of existing SPP law on public procurers, suppliers, the 
wider private sector and sustainability outcomes is needed to put political debates about 
SPP on a more sound foundation. Furthermore, it is crucial for policy analysts to 
establish in which socio-economic as well as political and legal contexts SPP is likely to 
be most effective. 
  
SPP legislation that only enables the intake of sustainability criteria is potentially useless 
if it is not taken up by public procurers or if businesses are not capable of meeting the 
requirements. Extrapolating from the analysis above, three main recommendations on 
how to best implement or improve SPP legislation seem apparent: 
• Multi-stakeholder consultations should be pursued in the SPP policy development 
process in order to limit dangers and risks of SPP implementation, increase 
instrument application and enable mutual understanding about the positions and 
interests of stakeholders.  
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• Legal uncertainty and lacking capability of actors should be reduced by means of 
trainings, guidelines and adjustment assistance. A catalogue including applicable 
sustainability criteria could be annexed in order to reduce complexity and increase 
procurers’ capabilities. It would also raise application and approval rates for SPP 
proposals. Criteria should be based on well-known und widely used principles such 
as the UNGC principles, ILO standards or compliance to wage agreements.  
• The comprehensive inclusion of sustainability criteria in procurement processes 
requires broad political consensus as well as high-level priority. Governing parties 
should therefore strive to reach a widely accepted compromise and signal publicly 
that they are committed to SPP and sustainable development. Setting quantitative 
objectives and installing appropriate monitoring procedures would encourage SPP 
take-up and enable regular assessments.  
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